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In order to avoid unnecessary, time consuming, and costly litigation, the
Department of Defense, and more specifically the United States Navy, has adopted the use
of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) to resolve contract disputes. One of the less-used
but highly successful ADR techniques is known as the Mini-Trial.
The primary goals of this thesis are to provide contracting professionals and
attorneys with a better understanding of the Mini-Trial, explore how the Navy might make
better use of the technique, and outline the steps the Navy should take to further
implement its use. The thesis provides information on the Mini-Trial's background,
factors for use, advantages and disadvantages, format, and roles of participants. The
researcher found that there are a number of issues surrounding the Mini-Trial including,
problems with neutrals and principals, and the perception that the Navy was reluctant to
use the technique. Principal findings from the research revealed that there are key
measures of success for the Mini-Trial, that barriers exist to convince contractors to
participate, that there are certain conditions for its use, and that the Navy will increase its
use of the technique in the future. Principal recommendations are that the Navy should
not second guess its principals, ensure settlement funds are paid promptly, establish an
agency ombudsman to answer ADR questions, and conduct face-to-face discussions with






C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 2
1. Primary Research Question 3




G. LITERATURE SEARCH AND METHODOLOGY 5
H. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 6
H. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
AND USAGE 9
A. INTRODUCTION 9
B. CONTRACT DISPUTES ACT OF 1978 9
C. ADMINISTRATIVE DISPUTES RESOLUTION ACT OF 1990 10
D. FEDERAL ACQUISITION STREAMLINING ACT OF 1994 12
E ADMINISTRATIVE DISPUTES RESOLUTION ACT OF 1996 13
F. FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION 14
G DEFENSE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION SUPPLEMENT 15
H. EXECUTIVE ORDERS 12979 AND 12988 15
vn
I ADVANTAGES OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 16
J. DISADVANTAGES OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 17
K INCREASED USAGE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 18
1. Reasons For Increased Usage ofADR 18
2. Statistics For ADR Success 20
L. SUMMARY 21
m. INTRODUCTION OF THE MINI-TRIAL 23
A OVERVIEW OF TFIE MINT-TRIAL 23
B. THE HISTORY OF THE MINI-TRIAL 23
C. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE MINI-TRIAL 25
1. Advantages of the Mini-Trial 25
2. Disadvantages of the Mini-Trial 26
D FACTORS FOR AND AGAINST THE USE OF THE MINI-TRIAL 27
1. Factors For the Use of the Mini-Trial 27
2. Factors Against the Use of the Mini-Trial 28
E TIMING OF THE MINI-TRIAL 29
F COMMON REASONS FOR CHOOSING OTHER ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION TECHNIQUES 31
G. SUMMARY 32
IV. KEY ELEMENTS OF THE MINI-TRIAL 33
A. INTRODUCTION 33
B. EVALUATING THE POSSIBLE USE OF THE MINI-TRIAL 33
vin
C SELECTING AND PREPARING PRINCIPALS 34
1. Selecting a Principal 34
2. Analysis 35
3. Preparation of the Principal 36
D. USE OF A THIRD PARTY NEUTRAL 36
1. Possible Roles For Neutrals 36
2. Survey Results For Neutral Roles 37
3. Analysis 40
4. Choice of Neutrals 41
5. Analysis 44
E. THE MINI-TRIAL AGREEMENT 45
1
.
Purpose and Recommendations For Drafting the
Mini-Trial Agreement 45
2. Exchange ofPosition papers 46
3. Mini-Trial Schedule 47
4. Best Points Arguments 48
5. Location of the Mini-Trial 48
6. Allocation of Expenses 49
F THE MINI-TRIAL HEARING 49
G POST-PRESENTATION NEGOTIATIONS 51
H. DOCUMENTING THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 52
I. SUMMARY 53
IX
V. ISSUES IN THE USE OF THE MINI-TRIAL 55
A U.S. NAVY'S RELUCTANCE TO USE THE MINI-TRIAL 55
1. Survey Results 55
2. Analysis 57
B PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED WITH NEUTRALS 58
1. Survey Results 58
2. Analysis 60
C PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED WITH SENIOR
MANAGEMENT PRINCIPALS 64
1. Survey Results 64
2. Analysis 66




VI. ANALYSIS OF THE MINI-TRIAL 77
A. INTRODUCTION 77
B MEASURES OF SUCCESS OF THE MINI-TRIAL 77
1. Survey Results 77
2. Analysis 80
C. MOST EFFECTIVE USAGE OF THE MINI-TRIAL 84
1. Literature Review 84
2. Survey Results 85
3. Analysis 86
D BARRIERS TO CONVINCING CONTRACTORS TO PARTICIPATE
IN THE MINI-TRIAL 91
1. Literature Review 91
2. Survey Results 91
3. Analysis 96
E. FUTURE USE OF THE MINI-TRIAL 99
1. Survey Results 99
2. Analysis 101
F. SUMMARY 104




D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 119
1. Primary Research Question 119
2. Secondary Research Questions 120
E AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 124
APPENDIX: LISTING OF SURVEY PARTICIPANTS 125
LIST OF REFERENCES 127





In recent years, a quiet revolution has been occurring in the world of U.S.
Government contract dispute resolution. The Government has sought out mechanisms
aimed at minimizing conflict, reducing financial costs of dispute litigation, and preserving
the working relationship of parties involved in disputes. Traditionally, parties have relied
heavily on informal negotiations and litigation through the U.S. Court System. Although
informal negotiations can resolve some contract disputes, many disputes are too complex
or too highly charged to be resolved in an informal setting. However, formal litigation is
usually very costly and time consuming. It creates a hostile environment between the
parties involved. According to the late Supreme Court Justice Warren E. Burger,
The existing judicial system is too costly; too painful, too destructive, too
inefficient for a truly civilized people. . . Reliance on the adversarial process as the
principal means of resolving conflicts is a mistake that must be corrected. . . For
some disputes, trials will be the only means, but for many claims, trial by
adversarial contest must in time go the way of the ancient trial by battle and
blood. [Ref. 9]
In light of Justice Burger's comments, formal litigation should be viewed solely as the last
resort in dispute resolution.
To bridge the gap between informal negotiations and formal litigation, a number of
techniques known collectively as alternative dispute resolution (ADR) have been adopted
by Government agencies to resolve contract disputes. The Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR) defines ADR as "any procedure or combination of procedures voluntarily used to
resolve issues in controversy without the need to resort to litigation". [Ref. 19, Part
33.204] ADR techniques, such as Fact-finding, Mediation, non-binding Arbitration,
Negotiation, Partnering, and the Mini-Trial, furnish a faster, less expensive way to resolve
disputes. In general, ADR covers any voluntarily agreed upon method to resolve a
dispute before it goes to litigation. Without voluntary participation, ADR is not likely to
resolve a contract dispute. This thesis explores in detail the alternative dispute resolution
technique known as the Mini-Trial and issues surrounding its use.
B. OBJECTIVES
The primary objectives of this thesis are:
1
.
To provide a better understanding of the Mini-Trial technique and its use as a
method of resolving contract disputes in the Navy.
2. To explore the impact of recent Executive Orders, legislation, and regulations
on the Navy's use of the Mini-Trial and alternative dispute resolution.
3 To determine whether the Navy has been reluctant to use the Mini-Trial
technique and to explore conditions where the Navy might make better use of
the Mini-Trial.
4. To examine the Navy's use of the alternative dispute resolution technique
known as the "unassisted" Mini-Trial.
5 To identify what barriers exist to convincing contractors to participate in the
Mini-Trial and the action the Navy should take to overcome these barriers.
6. To assess the future usage of the Mini-Trial as an effective alternative dispute
resolution technique.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In addressing the objectives of this thesis, the following questions have been
structured:
1. Primary Research Question
How can the United States Navy most effectively utilize the Mini-Trial as a
method of alternative dispute resolution?
2. Secondary Research Questions
a. What is the Mini-Trial technique and how does it function?
b. What are the laws and regulations associated with the Mini-Trial and ADR?
c. To what extent has the United States Navy utilized the Mini-Trial and what
have been the results of its use?
d. What are the measures of success in employing the Mini-Trial and under what
conditions should the Mini-Trial be considered for use?
e. What actions should the Navy take to most effectively utilize the Mini-Trial as
a viable form of alternative dispute resolution?
D. SCOPE
The scope of this thesis is to provide background, references, and
recommendations so that Department of Defense and United States Navy contracting
officials and attorneys can make intelligent decisions as to when Mini-Trials could and
should be utilized. The areas focused upon will include the following:
1
.
Identifying the alternative dispute resolution technique known as the Mini-Trial, to
include discussion of its form, conditions for use, and advantages and
disadvantages.
2. Examining the Navy's use of the Mini-Trial as a method of alternative dispute
resolution.
3. Developing criteria for measuring the success of the Mini-Trial.
4. Recommending actions that the Navy could take to further implement the use of
the Mini-Trial.
There will be no in-depth analysis of other alternative dispute resolution techniques used
by the United States Navy or the Department of Defense. Furthermore, there will be no
attempt to imply that every, or for that matter any, contract dispute is identical. Every
dispute is unique, therefore Government contracting officials need to exercise good sense
and sound business judgment when deciding what method of resolution should be utilized.
Finally, there will be no attempt to generate empirical data. Only existing data and
information will be used in this thesis.
E. LIMITATIONS
Despite a plethora of magazine articles, conference papers, and Government
reports, there is little or no empirical data to support the cost and time benefits of the
Mini-Trial or other alternative dispute resolution techniques. All information regarding
alternative dispute resolutions is based on personal experience and expert opinion, not on
factual data. Consequently, all recommendations and conclusions are based on theoretical
information available. Due to the nature of the study, the researcher surveyed a large
percentage ofNavy attorneys. Although their input was invaluable, their responses may
have skewed the survey results of all Government attorneys. Furthermore, a future study
involving a larger sampling of individuals may be necessary to confirm the findings of this
thesis due to the limited number of Board of Contract Appeals judges and Government
and private attorneys who participated in the researcher's survey.
F. ASSUMPTIONS
This thesis was written under the following assumptions:
1
.
The reader has some knowledge of Federal contracting regulations concerning
contract dispute settlement.
2. The reader has a good working understanding of other alternative dispute
resolutions techniques (besides the Mini-Trial), their advantages and
disadvantages, and characteristics for case suitability.
3. The reader has legal assistance available to clarify and enhance the information
provided in the study.
G. LITERATURE SEARCH AND METHODOLOGY
The literature review focused on information available from private and public
agencies that specialize in alternative dispute resolution. The majority of the literature
was provided by academia, professional organizations (American Bar Association and
National Contract Management Association), Government agencies (Departments of the
Army, Air Force, and Navy, the Veterans Administration), Boards of Contract Appeals
(General Services Administration, Engineering, Armed Services), and from private
practitioners of law. The literature was gathered from journals and periodicals including
legal, judicial, law reviews, conflict resolution, and policy manuals. The Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and Defense Supplement to the FAR were also reviewed.
The literature review was conducted to provide the researcher with a well-rounded view
of the Mini-Trial technique and issues surrounding its usage. Although the literature
search was by no means exhaustive of the articles that have been published regarding the
Mini-Trial, the data reviewed provided a satisfactory representation of what was available.
The bibliography contains a listing of the materials reviewed by the researcher.
A survey was conducted by the researcher to gather expert opinion on issues
surrounding the Mini-Trial. Due to the limited number of practitioners of the Mini-Trial,
only 26 personnel from various Government agencies and private law firms were
surveyed. Personnel from the Federal Government were chosen based on
recommendations from various Government alternative dispute advocates and
practitioners. In many cases, personnel surveyed on the phone recommended other points
of contact within the Government and private practice. All individuals surveyed were very
helpful in clarifying ideas and perceptions, and providing source materials. A listing of
individuals (with their title and organization) participating in the survey is attached in the
Appendix.
H. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
This thesis is organized around seven chapters. Chapter I provides a brief
introduction of the need for alternative dispute resolution and outlines the objectives and
research questions of the thesis. It also delineates the scope, limitations, and assumptions
of the thesis and outlines the methodology used to conduct the necessary research.
Chapter II discusses the Executive orders, legislation, and regulations that impact
the Government's use of the Mini-Trial and alternative dispute resolution. The chapter
highlights the advantages and disadvantages associated with alternative dispute
resolutions. The chapter also examines the reasons for the recent increase in the use of
alternative dispute resolution. Chapter II concludes with a review of statistics surrounding
the successful use of alternative dispute resolution.
Chapter III introduces the reader to the Mini-Trial technique, provides a definition
of the Mini-Trial, and explores its background. The chapter discusses the factors for and
against the use of the technique, the timing of its use, and states its advantages and
disadvantages. The chapter concludes with an examination of the most common reasons
for selecting other alternative dispute resolution techniques over the Mini-Trial.
Chapter IV discusses key elements of the Mini-Trial including the initiation of the
use of the Mini-Trial, selection and preparation of principals, and the use of third party
neutrals. The researcher provides analysis of the most effective role for the neutral as well
as selection of the neutral. The chapter examines in detail the Mini-Trial agreement,
including the purpose of the agreement, the use of position papers and schedules, the
concept of best points presentations, location for the trial, and allocation of trial expenses.
Furthermore, the chapter describes the flow of the trial, follow-on negotiations, and
documentation of the settlement agreement.
Chapter V is the first of two chapters exploring issues relating to the use of the
mini-trial. The chapter explores whether there has been any reluctance by the Navy to use
the Mini-Trial. It also analyzes the problems encountered with third party neutrals and
principals during Mini-Trials. The chapter concludes with discussion and analysis of the
Navy's use of the alternative dispute resolution technique known as the "unassisted"
Mini-Trial.
Chapter VI continues the exploration of issues surrounding the Mini-Trial begun in
Chapter V. The chapter provides discussion and analysis of the measures of success of the
Mini-Trial and how the Navy could most effectively utilize the technique. The chapter
also examines the barriers that exist to convince a contractor to participate in the Mini-
Trial technique and suggests how the Navy might overcome the barriers identified. The
chapter concludes with an analysis of the Navy's nature use of the Mini-Trial.
Chapter VII summarizes the significant findings of the study, answers the primary
and secondary research questions, and makes conclusions and recommendations based on
the discussion and analysis of the information presented in previous chapters. The chapter
concludes with recommendations for further research.
n. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND
USAGE
A. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the Government has used legislation, Executive Orders, and
regulations to encourage the use ofADR to resolve contract disputes. From ADR's early
appearance in the Contract Disputes Act in 1978, to the most recent Administrative
Dispute Resolution Act in 1996, Congress' statutory ADR initiatives have increased ADR
usage among Government agencies. This chapter will highlight major ADR initiatives and
their impact on Government agencies. In addition, the chapter will discuss ADR's
advantages and disadvantages and the use ofADR within the Department of Defense and
Federal Government
B. CONTRACT DISPUTES ACT OF 1978
The Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA) was designed to furnish a legal and
administrative system to resolve contract claims. [Ref. 19, Sec. 33.202] The Act
encourages dispute resolution at "the earliest stage feasible and by the fastest and least
expensive means possible" prior to litigation and offers alternate forums for handling
different disputes. [Ref. 2, pg. 1] The Act's primary goal is to ensure that both the
contractor and the Government receive fair and equitable treatment in regards to a
dispute. Formal procedures and time frames were established for parties to file disputes
and appeals. The Act made these procedures mandatory for all contract disputes. The
following steps highlight the Act's requirements: [Ref. 17, pg. 24-26]
1.
First and foremost, the contracting officer should attempt to negotiate and
resolve the dispute.
2. If these negotiations fail, the contractor must receive a contracting officer's
final decision (COFD) in regards to the dispute.
3. Once the COFD is issued, the contractor may accept the decision or file an
appeal with either:
a. the Board of Contract Appeals (BCAs) within 90 days, or
b. the U.S. Court of Claims within one year.
4. The BCA and U.S. Court of Claims render their decisions.
5. Appeals to BCA decisions must be submitted to the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit within 120 days of the Board's decision; appeals of the Court
of Claims must be submitted within 60 days to the Court of Appeals.
6. If further appeals are considered necessary, parties submit a final appeal within
60 days to the United States Supreme Court .
Based on the results of a survey conducted by the researcher, the impact of the Contract
Disputes Act was considered minimal because the Act merely formalized an already
existing ADR process. Contracting Officers always had the authority to resolve disputes
at their level and contractors could still appeal an adverse Contracting Officer's final
decision to a Board of Contract Appeals.
C. ADMINISTRATIVE DISPUTES RESOLUTION ACT OF 1990
The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990 (ADRA 1990) was Congress'
attempt to encourage the voluntary use of ADR to resolve Government disputes prior to
litigation. [Ref 28, pg. 13] The Act stated that "an agency may use an ADR proceeding
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for the resolution of an issue in controversy.
.
.if the parties agree to such
proceedings". [Ref. 4, pg. 1] The ADRA 1990 amended the CDA by permitting
contracting officers to utilize ADR techniques to resolve claims. The Act recognized
several types ofADR techniques (including negotiation, mediation, arbitration and mini-
trials) that could be employed in different circumstances. However, it recognized that
ADR was not appropriate in all situations. [Ref. 1, pg. 5] The ADRA 1990 also
incorporated a sunset provision terminating its effect in October 1995. [Ref. 1, pg. VI]
The Act provided Federal agencies with a great deal of flexibility on how and
when to use ADR but mandated the following key program requirements: [Ref. 1, pg. V]
1
.
Develop a policy addressing the use ofADR in resolving contract disputes.
2. Appoint a senior official as "dispute resolution specialist" who is responsible
for implementation of the Act and for developing agency ADR policy.
3. Provide ADR training for the "dispute resolution specialist" and other key
agency representatives on a regular basis.
4. Review agency standard contracts to determine whether they can be amended
to encourage ADR use.
In addition to mandating the program requirements listed above, the Act authorized
parties to enter into binding arbitration, so long as agency heads retained the authority to
vacate an arbitrator's decision within 30 days. [Ref. 1, pg. VI] Parties were also permitted
to restrict the arbitrator's decision to a pre-determined range of outcomes. The ADRA
1990 also sought to balance the needs of confidentiality with the openness required in
Government. The Act stated that "a neutral in a dispute resolution proceeding shall not
voluntarily disclose . . any information concerning dispute resolution communications. .."
unless all parties agree to the disclosure. [Ref. 37, Sec.3(a)] The Act extended protection
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for communications involving both public and private neutrals. All formal and informal
documentation produced as a result of the ADR is considered inadmissible in court if the
ADR technique is unsuccessful in resolving the dispute.
Finally, the Act addressed Government agencies' authority to procure the services
of neutrals. [Ref 32, pg. 1] Government agencies are now authorized to contract for the
services of both public and private neutrals. The Act also authorizes agencies to utilize
the services of other agencies to act as neutrals with or without reimbursement. For
example, the Department of the Navy can now request the neutral services of a General
Services Administration Board of Contract Appeals (GSBCA) judge to hear a case
normally heard by an Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) judge. This
authority permits agencies to use the services of the neutral it believes is best suited for the
dispute.
Although the ADRA 1990 helped focus agencies on ADR by requiring
appointment of Agency ADR specialists, the survey conducted by the researcher revealed
that the Act had limited impact on ADR process. A Government official surveyed
commented that "no regulation [including the ADRA 1990 and ADRA 1996] can compel
litigants to avail themselves of the ADR process".
D. FEDERAL ACQUISITION STREAMLINING ACT OF 1994
In order to improve the efficiency of Government contracting, Congress enacted
the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) in 1994 . Among its many provisions,
the Act stressed the importance of ADR as a means of contract dispute resolution.
FASA extended the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act's sunset date to 1999 insofar
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as it applies to contract claims. [Ref. 1, VII] This extension encouraged continued usage
ofADR until the passage of more permanent ADR legislation. Key provisions ofFASA
impacting ADR include: [Ref. 41, pg. 5]
1
.
Provides agencies with authority to obtain the services of a neutral without
competition, enabling parties to react quickly once it is agreed that ADR will
be attempted.
2. Permits parties to utilize a board neutrals who otherwise would have
jurisdiction over the dispute or select from a pool of Federal mediators. Like
the ADRA 1990, this provision encourages parties to select the best neutral for
a given dispute.
3. Requires a party to explain any decision to reject another party's request for
ADR. The purpose of this provision is to force a party to explain to the Board
and the other party why it is unwilling to engage in ADR to resolve a dispute.
Like ADRA 1990, most people surveyed by the researcher stated that FASA has
had limited impact on the use of ADR. However, a few survey participants commented
that FASA's requirement for the Contracting Officer to respond in writing when they
reject a contractor's request for ADR will further prevent arbitrary decisions by the
Contracting Officer.
E. ADMINISTRATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION ACT OF 1996
Following the success of the ADRA 1990 and the need for permanent legislation,
the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996 (ADRA 1996) was passed to reinforce
"Congress' interest in and recognition of the potential benefits of alternative dispute
techniques". [Ref. 14] The Act refined and made permanent most of the provisions in the
original Act. Although the new ADRA left most provisions unchanged, it did alter the
ADRA 1990 in the following manner: [Ref. 41, pg. 5]
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1.
Eliminated the Government's right to escape unfavorable arbitration decisions.
Previously, the Government could 'opt' out of binding arbitration decisions.
Many believe that the elimination of the escape clause will encourage private
parties to enter into binding arbitration more often.
2. Required agencies to formalize in writing arbitration's use to prevent them
from trying to back out of the process midway.
3 Protected all communications between neutrals and parties from disclosure
under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Prior to the ADRA 1996,
communications could be disclosed publicly in some circumstances under
FOIA
4. Provided further clarification of an agency's ability to contract for neutrals.
5 Removed special certification requirements for claims that did not exceed
$ 100,000 in ADR proceedings, thereby simplifying the ADR process.
F. FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION
In order to implement the ADRA 1990 and 1996, the Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) states that it is "the Government's policy to try to resolve all
contractual issues in controversy by mutual agreement at the contracting officer's
level". [Ref. 19, Sec. 33.204] In supporting this policy, the FAR authorizes Contracting
Officers, within their authority "...to decide or resolve all claims arising under or relating
to a contract.
. .
."[Ref 19, Sec. 33. 2 10] The FAR also encourages Contracting Officers to
use ADR to the maximum extent practicable to all or a portion of a claim. The FAR also
lists essential elements for using ADR techniques: [Ref. 19, Sec. 33.214]
1
.
Existence of an issue in controversy.
2. A voluntary election by both parties to participate in the ADR process.
3. An agreement on alternate procedures and terms to be used in lieu of formal
litigation.
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4. Participation in the process by officials of both parties who have the authority
to resolve the dispute.
5. Certification by the contractor of a claim where necessary.
Other major FAR provisions pertaining to ADR include authorization to use neutrals, a
requirement that the Contracting officer provide a written explanation for the rejection of
a contractor's request for ADR, and factors that may make the use ofADR
inappropriate. [Ref. 19, Sec.33.214] In addition, the FAR provides detailed "procedures
and requirements for asserting and resolving claims" subject to the Contract Disputes Act
of 1978[Ref. 19, Sec.33.202]
G. DEFENSE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION SUPPLEMENT
Unlike the FAR, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
(DFARS) does not directly discuss the use ofADR within the Department of Defense.
However, the DFARS does discuss the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals'
(ASBCA) authority to hear appeals, their jurisdiction to consider appeals, and the appeals
process.[Ref. 10, Sec. 233.2 and Appx. A] The DFARS also re-emphasizes certification
requirements for claims under the Contract Disputes Act of 1978.
H. EXECUTIVE ORDERS 12979 AND 12988
Within the past three years, two Executive Orders have been issued that relate to
the use ofADR. The first of these, Executive Order 12979, signed on 25 October 1995,
targeted ADR as a favored settlement device with respect to protests. The Order
encouraged agencies "to provide for inexpensive, informal, procedurally simple and
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expeditious resolution of protests, including.
.
the use of alternative dispute resolution
techniques"[Ref. 4, pg.3] Where early legislation including the Contract Disputes Act,
ADRA 1990, and ADRA 1996, had only addressed disputes; Executive Order 12979 was
the first piece of legislation aimed at addressing protests by unsuccessful offerors. The
Order also tasked the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) with providing policy
guidance for Government agencies. To date, OFPP has not issued any policy guidance
regarding ADR.
The second order, Executive Order 12988, signed in February 1996, urged
Government counsel to make every attempt to settle disputes before pursuing litigation.
The Order stated that "whenever feasible, claims should be resolved through informal
discussions, negotiations, and settlements rather than through utilization of any formal
court proceeding". [Ref. 14, pg. 2] It further stated "where the benefits of alternative
dispute resolution may be derived. . litigation counsel should suggest the use of an
appropriate ADR technique to the parties". [Ref. 14, pg.2] Both Executive Orders 12988
and 12979 are strong endorsements by the President to use ADR whenever feasible.
I. ADVANTAGES OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
When parties consider using ADR to resolve a contract dispute, it is important to
consider both its advantages and disadvantages. ADR provides a number of advantages
over traditional litigation which include the following: [Ref. 4, pg.5]
1 . Provides expedited resolution of a dispute. Many cases can be resolved using
ADR within weeks or months after a dispute arises versus many months or
even years using formal litigation.
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2. Saves both the Government and the contractor significant amounts of money.
The short duration ofADR proceedings and limitations on discovery and
motions save both parties money in terms of legal fees and management
involvement.
3. Preserves confidentiality. ADR maintains confidentiality in disputes involving
highly sensitive corporate information or in situations where the news of the
dispute may bring adverse publicity to either party.
4. Preserves on-going business relationships. Since ADR is less adversarial than
litigation, parties are usually able to work together once the dispute is resolved.
5. Avoids program delays that occur due to protracted litigation. With expedited
dispute resolution, parties are able to re-focus their efforts on the program
sooner.
6. Shifts the focus of decision making from judges and lawyers to business
professionals. In most forms of ADR, senior management principals maintain
decision making authority over the dispute.
7. Forces both parties to communicate. After a dispute has gone on for awhile
without resolution, parties often become so entrenched in their opinions that
they are unwilling to carry on negotiations with the other party. ADR requires
open and direct communications, which are often facilitated by the use of a
third party neutral. Communications facilitated by a neutral can also help
break an impasse that may arise during disputes.
8. Allows complicated issues and facts to be analyzed by experts and senior
management instead of non-expert juries.
9. Enhances the "buy-in" by both parties to a possible solution.
10. Supports current policy and preserves the perception that the Government is a
fair buyer
J. DISADVANTAGES OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Despite its many advantages, ADR has several disadvantages that may prevent
parties from using ADR to resolve a contract dispute. ADR's disadvantages include the
following: [Ref. 4. Pg.5]
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1.
ADR can not be used to set precedence. In order to set a precedence, a
dispute would have to be heard by the Court of Claims or a Board of Contract
Appeals.
2. With the exception of binding arbitration, ADR is not binding on either party
until negotiations are successfully concluded and an agreement is signed.
Either party can withdraw from an ADR proceeding at any time.
3. Settlement by senior level principals may be subject to second guessing by
auditors and other senior management.
4. In the case of Government contracting, successful ADR can accelerate the
need for settlement funding from current year's funds in order to repay the
Judgment Fund. In most programs, contingency funding is not readily
available.
5. ADR requires a heavy investment of senior management's time. Preparations
leading up to and involvement of senior management as principals during ADR
proceedings consumes enormous amounts of time.
K. INCREASED USAGE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
1. Reasons For Increased Usage ofADR
Over the past decade, ADR has been increasingly utilized to settle a wide range of
Government contract disputes including requests for equitable adjustments, inspection and
acceptance issues, default determinations, and bid protests. [Ref. 4, pg.8] Based on a
survey conducted by the researcher, Agencies' increased usage ofADR can be traced to a
variety of reasons, foremost of which is the realization of parties to see the savings of
time and money that ADR provides. A second reason for increased usage is the growing
volume of statutes, regulations, and Executive Orders recently promulgated that strongly
encourage that ADR be used to the maximum extent possible. Such acts as the ADRA
1990 and 1996 mandated that each agency establish its own ADR policy, conduct regular
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training for ADR specialists, and assign a senior level representative as Dispute Resolution
Specialist.
The third explanation for the increased emphasis on the use ofADR is due to the
increasing number of Governmental and professional organization papers and seminars
extolling the advantages and success stories ofADR. For example, numerous articles and
seminars pertaining to ADR are sponsored by groups such as the American Bar
Association and the National Contract Management Association. Another reason for
ADR's rise in prominence is due to the growing number of agencies, contractors, and
attorneys who have had positive experiences using ADR. If a dispute resolution technique
is used and both parties believe it successfully resolved their dispute, they will be more
willing to enter into ADR again in future disputes.
As agencies and clients have become more familiar with ADR, the anxiety over the
misperception that ADR is a "process without rules or procedures" lessens. [Ref 21, pg.
3] As Government and private counsel learn the rules and procedures, they are less
intimidated by the process and become more willing to recommend its use. Another reason
for the rise in ADR usage is due to the incorporation ofADR clauses in agencies'
contracts. These clauses establish a partnering process, commit the parties to try to
resolve all disputes through negotiations, and encourage the use of non-binding ADR
techniques if negotiations should fail. [Ref. 30, pg 6] ADR clauses foster early ADR usage
and help to minimize the financial impact of future contract disputes
A final explanation for ADR's increased usage in Government contract disputes is
the promotion ofADR by the Board of Contract Appeals. Many BCA judges emphasize
the option of using ADR during the pre-hearing conference with the parties in dispute.
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Parties often become enthusiastic about ADR's ability to save time and effort, and how it
can provide a "swift and informal resolution of the dispute". [Ref 21, pg. 4] In a 1996
survey ofBCA judges' attitudes toward ADR, "over 85 percent (ofjudges) believe that
encouraging the parties to engage in ADR should be an integral part of board
proceedings". [Ref. 23, pg.3] This figure is a 15 percent increase over the number ofBCA
judges responding to the question in a 1994 survey. [Ref. 30, pg.7]
2. Statistics ofADR Success
Since the late 1980's, Government agencies, Boards of Contract Appeals, and
private industry have experienced increases in the successful use of ADR. For example,
since the early 1990's, the Department of the Air Force "has attempted to use ADR to
resolve 65 contractual issues in controversy and has achieved a resolution rate of 96
percent". [Ref. 30, pg.7] A Government ADR Specialist surveyed by the author stated
that the Departments of the Navy and Army have similar success rates, both exceeding 90
percent. Results from a 1996 survey of Board of Contract Appeals judges revealed that
the overall success rate for non-binding ADRs was between 90 and 95 percent. [Ref. 23,
pg.4] These results are comparable to the findings of the same survey conducted in 1994
which showed a success rate of approximately 95 percent. [Ref. 23, pg. 4] The General
Services Administration Board of Contract Appeals (GSBCA) reports that since 1992,
they have experienced a resolution rate of 84 percent. [Ref. 15, pg. 56]
For fiscal year 1994, the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA)
received 19 requests for ADR covering 29 appeals, while it received 31 requests covering
61 appeals in fiscal year 1995. [Ref. 23, pg.2] These figures show a 63 percent increase in
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requests received and a 210 percent increase in the number of appeals between fiscal years
1994 and 1995. Although figures are not currently available for fiscal year 1996, a BCA
judge commented that he expected fiscal year 1 996 figures to be even higher.
The private sector has also seen an increased use ofADR to resolve contract
disputes. Several private attorneys surveyed noted a significant increase in the requests
for ADR from their clients. A few of these attorneys also commented that their firms had
recently focused greater attention on ADR methods and techniques to advise clients
during ADR proceedings. Other private organizations, including the American Bar
Association, have also noted increased use and success of ADR. In one recent survey,
the American Society of Civil Engineers, reported in 1994 that its dispute resolution
board had heard 225 disputes and had resolved 208, for a resolution rate exceeding 92
percent. [Ref. 30, pg. 8]
L. SUMMARY
This chapter discussed recent legislation, regulations and Executive Orders
impacting Governmental use of ADR. Specifically identified were the Contract Disputes
Act of 1978, Administrative Dispute Resolution Acts from 1990 and 1996, the Federal
Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Executive Orders 12979 and 12988, and the
Federal Acquisition Regulation. Some of the advantages and disadvantages of using ADR
were identified and discussed. The chapter concluded with an overview of explanation for
ADR's increased usage in both Government and in the private sector. Statistics were also
cited showing agency resolution rates supporting ADR's ability to successfully resolve
contract disputes. The next chapter will introduce the Mini-Trial, its background, and
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factors for and against its use. The chapter will also explore its advantages and
disadvantages and reasons for selecting alternatives to the Mini-Trial.
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ffl. INTRODUCTION OF THE MINI-TRIAL
A. OVERVIEW OF THE MINI-TRIAL
The Mini-Trial is the most widely-used ADR procedure to resolve Government
contractual issues in controversy
.
[Ref. 34] A Mini-Trial is not an actual trial. It is a
structured voluntary settlement process that allows both parties to submit their cases to
senior management principals who have authority to settle the dispute, or to a third party
neutral who helps facilitate discussions between principals. Whether a third party neutral
is involved or not, the principals are the only players who can resolve the issues at hand.
The Mini-Trial allows for a shortened pre-trial preparation and abbreviated best case
presentations by both parties. [Ref. 8, pg. 778]
Upon completion of the presentations, the principals attempt to negotiate a
settlement, often with the assistance of a third party neutral. The neutral can fill a variety
of roles, such as evaluator, facilitator, or mediator. The role played by the neutral is
ultimately determined by the mutual desires of the parties. Like many other ADR
techniques, the Mini-Trial is voluntary and non-binding; therefore a party can drop out of
the process at any point if it so chooses. [Ref. 18, pg.l]
B. THE HISTORY OF THE MINI-TRIAL
Despite the Mini-Trial's recent rebirth as an ADR technique, its origins date back
to World War II. During the war, the Bureau of Yards and Docks (later to be known as
Naval Facilities Engineering Command, (NAVFAC)) established a Contract Award and
Review Board, known as a Chiefs Board. [Ref. 39, pg. 2] The board consisted of senior
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engineering officers who's function it was to hear contractors' claims against the
Government. The contractor's senior management, accompanied by legal counsel, would
present their case, followed by Government counsel's opposing opinion, all in trial type
setting. [Ref. 39, pg. 2] After hearing both parties' presentations, the Chiefs Board would
then attempt to negotiate a settlement with the contractor's senior management. If a
settlement was not reached, the Contracting Officer would issue a final decision and the
contractor's appeals would proceed to the courts. Although the Chiefs Board was not
successful in every dispute, the board was able to satisfactorily resolve many of the claims
brought against the Bureau.
In recent years, the Mini-Trial concept has metamorphosed into a process where a
third party neutral assists in the process but does not have a stake in the outcome as in the
case of the Chiefs Board. In addition to NAVFAC's use, the Army Corps of Engineers
adopted the Mini-Trial as one of its primary dispute resolution techniques. The Corps has
been able to resolve a multitude of large and complex construction claims using the Mini-
Trial technique. As a result of their successes, the Corps has published several well-
known Mini-Trial case studies, including the Term Tom Constructors and General Roofing
Company cases, ". . .to encourage its managers to develop and utilize new ways of
resolving disputes". [Ref. 45, inside cover] Due in part to the Corps' success with the
Mini-Trial, a number of Governmental agencies and organizations, including the
Departments of the Navy and Air Force, the Army Material Command, General Services
Administration, and the Boards of Contract Appeals have adopted its use. [Ref. 4, pg. 8-9]
The use of the Mini-Trial is not solely reserved for Government use. A large
number of companies including Allied Corporation, AT&T, Borden, Shell Oil, Standard
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Oil of Indiana, Texaco, TRW, and Xerox have recently utilized the Mini-Trial. [Ref. 18,
pg. 8] They have used it to resolve a variety of disputes including breaches of contract,
construction claims, human resource disputes, international commercial disputes, and
product liability cases. A recent survey of 1 14 companies showed that the Mini-Trial was
the most frequently used method of ADR, employed over 38% of the time. [Ref. 18, pg.
8]
C. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE MINI-TRIAL
1. Advantages of the Mini-Trial
As with any form of ADR, the Mini-Trial has a number of advantages that favor its
use. The following advantages are found in the mini-trial technique: [Ref. 18, pg. 3]
a. Allows principals from both parties to make decisions. Any agreements that
come out of the Mini-Trial process will be a joint decision made by the
principals, not dictated terms from a third party arbitrator or judge.
b. Permits greater flexibility in final settlements. Instead of the "winner/loser"
concept found in litigation, the parties can jointly decide on a variety of
satisfactory outcomes where both sides can claim victory
c. Allows for continued relationships. Because both parties play a role in the final
outcome, they generally feel good about the decision and the opposing party.
A "win-win" situation fosters continued working relationships.
d. Allows for significant cost and time savings. Major litigation can take months
or even years, which translates into enormous legal fees. Mini-trials limit the
time for discovery, presentations, and the number of key witnesses, thereby,
reducing the cost involved in resolving the dispute.
e. Focuses both parties on best case presentations. Since the length of
presentations and number of exhibits are often limited, the Mini-Trial forces
parties to present their strongest arguments up front.
f. Allows for candid communications. [Ref. 20] Due to its informal, non-litigative
environment and confidentiality, parties often feel more comfortable in openly
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discussing issues and possible solutions that would not have been discussed in
formal litigation.
g. Reduces the time Management spends focusing on the dispute. Time is money
in the business world and senior management devotes far less time preparing
and participating in a mini-trial compared with a dispute that goes to court.
h. Clarifies key issues or removes lesser issues prior to formal litigation even if
the dispute is not resolved. It also allows legal counsel an opportunity to test
their case and to discover which arguments are more persuasive, which can
actually strengthen their case should they need to go to court. [Ref. 18, pg. 10]
2. Disadvantages of the Mini-Trial
Despite its advantages, the Mini-Trial has several limitations when compared with
other forms of ADR, including the following: [Ref. 35, pg. 2]
a. The Mini-Trial is one of the most time consuming and costly ADR methods;
however it is far less time consuming when compared to formal litigation.
b. Since Mini-Trials are not performed in a court of law, there is no protection
against parties making false or misleading statements. This drawback is
present in most ADR settings and most attorneys are capable of protecting
their clients from misleading statements. Informal cross-examinations and
rebuttals by parties in the Mini-Trial process also help protect against
misleading statements.
c. Second guessing of the principal's decision can be a problem since few
members of his organization are actually present. The principal makes the best
decision based on both parties' cases. More than a few principals have been
accused of "giving away the store" during the mini-trial. If Senior
Management has confidence in their principal's ability, this should not be a
major problem.
d. The principal's decision can have a demoralizing effect on lower levels of
management. [Ref. 39, pg. 2] Since lower management was not part of the
final decision, they may feel that the principal gave the dispute only a brief,
cursory review prior to settling. This possible resentment by lower
management can be overcome by providing a tactful debrief that explains the
reasoning and rationale for the decision.
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e. The Mini-Trial can tie up inordinate amounts of Senior Management's time.
Although the Mini-trial is relatively short in duration, intensive preparations
and the actual trial will absorb most of the senior manager's valuable time.
D. FACTORS FOR AND AGAINST THE USE OF THE MINI-TRIAL
No one ADR technique can resolve all contract dispute cases, however, ADR and
the Mini-Trial can settle cases that do not belong in formal litigation. The following lists
highlight factors in favor and against the use of the Mini-Trial: [Ref. 35, pg. 2]
1. Factors For the Use of the Mini-Trial
a. Parties are interested in resolving the dispute but personality conflicts stand in
the way.
b. The case is primarily factual in nature (in a well-settled area of the law).
c. Parties want to retain control over the final outcome, versus having the court
system decide the issue.
d. A fairly clear entitlement to consideration exists, and the primary task is to
negotiate the quantum or amount of the award.
e. Parties desire to have a continuing relationship exist. It often makes more
sense for parties to continue doing business with each other for the next 1
years rather than severing the relationship and suffering the cost and disruption
of litigation. [Ref. 50, pg. C4]
f Parties or their legal counsels have unrealistic views of their positions and a
third party neutral's appraisal might dislodge the obstinate parties. This is
particularly applicable when the third party neutral is a technical expert who
might provide beneficial independent analysis.
g. The Mini-Trial can speed up the settlement process by concentrating parties on
the key issues needed to resolve the dispute.
h. Parties seek to avoid possible media exposure (privacy is a premium).
i. The dispute involves a relatively small amount of money. A serious threat
exists for costs to approach or exceed the amount of the dispute if the case
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goes to the Board or courts. However, the Mini-Trial is not necessarily limited
to small dollar disputes and has been used to resolve multi-million dollar cases.
j. If the contract includes an ADR clause, companies are more willing to try to
resolve the dispute using the Mini-Trial or other ADR techniques rather than
taking their dispute to the Board or courts.
k. Parties recognize some liability in the claim.
1. Senior management is willing to give their time and support for the process.
m. Parties have reached a negotiation impasse that may be overcome through the
use of a third party neutral.
2. Factors Against the Use of the Mini-Trial
Although the Mini-Trial can be used to resolve a multitude of different contract
disputes, it should not be employed in the following circumstances: [Ref 35, pg. 2]
a. Any sort of fraud investigation is an immediate show-stopper if considering the
Mini-Trial or other ADR technique. [Ref. 30, pg. 3] Situations involving fraud
are best handled by the court system.
b. The Mini-Trial is not recommended when the dispute involves important legal
or policy issues where establishing a precedent is desired. Despite its many
advantages, the Mini-Trial and ADR can not establish legal precedence.
c. The Mini-Trial is being used as a stalling technique prior to litigation. All ADR
techniques, including the Mini-Trial, require both sides to be honest and frank
in discussions without any secret agendas or plans.
d. If the case is most likely to be resolved using unassisted negotiations, the Mini-
Trial process is not necessary.
e. When parties or their counsels are particularly emotional, bellicose, and
abusive, the chances for a successful Mini-Trial are significantly diminished.
Although ADR does not require total cooperation, it is far more likely to be
successful if parties can communicate and reason together. [Ref. 50, pg C4]
f. If a delay will benefit one of the parties, the Mini-Trial and other ADR
techniques are unlikely to be successful.
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g. When a monetary imbalance exists between parties (when one party is
substantially wealthier than the other), and the wealthier party believes it can
wear down the opposition through costly legal battling, it will be difficult to
convince the wealthy party to participate in a Mini-Trial. [Ref. 50, pg. C3]
h. Parties or legal counsels hold anti-ADR attitudes or are unwilling to see the
benefits of ADR.
i. The case can be disposed of quicker through the use of an expedited Board of
Contract Appeals or Court of Claims process. [Ref. 30, pg.4]
E. TIMING OF THE MINI-TRIAL
According to a Board of Contract Appeals judge surveyed by the researcher, the
Mini-Trial can be used at any point of a contract dispute - prior to a Contracting Officer's
final decision (COFD), before a Board or Court hearing, and occasionally, during
litigation. One of the biggest challenges confronting Contracting Officers and legal
counsel is determining at what point of a dispute the Mini-Trial should be used. The most
obvious answer to this question is the "earlier the better". This answer follows the
reasoning that the sooner the Mini-Trial is undertaken, the greater the savings of time and
money. In addition, earlier use of the Mini-Trial may allow the parties to settle a dispute
before developing an adversarial mentality towards each other. Although there is a great
deal of truth to these "early" Mini-Trial justifications, there are other considerations that
suggest that later usage of the Mini-Trial could be more advantageous.
For a Mini-Trial to be effective, all basic facts and issues must be defined. In order
to establish these facts, a certain amount of discovery and investigation must take place for
the parties to be adequately prepared for the presentations and the follow-on negotiations.
If a Mini-Trial is attempted without some discovery and investigation, neither party would
have a good understanding of their position or the position of the opposing party.
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Numerous Government officials surveyed by the author commented that the Mini-Trial
should be considered only after both parties have made necessary preparations.
Another consideration prior to using the Mini-Trial is the cost and time involved in
preparations. Compared with other ADR techniques such as Mediation and Negotiation,
the Mini-Trial requires a great deal more preparation time, expenditure of man-hours, and
expense. [Ref. 39, pg. 4] A Mini-Trial should not be used as the initial effort to resolve a
dispute but later in the dispute process after parties have expended a significant amount of
preparation effort and have exhausted more simple ADR avenues. However, it is
important not to wait too long in the dispute process to use the Mini-Trial. A general
consensus of people surveyed by the researcher revealed that the longer parties delay, the
more entrenched they will become in their positions and the less willing they will be to
work together towards resolving the problem.
The most effective time to propose a Mini-Trial is just before the Contracting
Officer reaches a final decision or, if already pursuing litigation, early in the discovery
process, and before there are significant litigation costs. [Ref. 18, pg. 10] Delaying the use
of the Mini-Trial until later in the dispute process accommodates the need for some
amount of discovery and investigation. Several Government officials surveyed by the
researcher agreed that the its use should be delayed and that the Mini-Trial should not be
used as a "first resort" resolution technique.
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F. COMMON REASONS FOR CHOOSING OTHER ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION TECHNIQUES
The most cited reason for choosing another form ofADR over the Mini-Trial is
that the Mini-Trial is simply more complicated and time consuming than is necessary to
resolve many disputes. When factual issues are easily understood and do not require more
detailed presentations by witnesses, more simple forms of ADR, such as Mediation and
Assisted Negotiations, are more appropriate. For example, Mediation is often chosen
because it provides both facilitation and evaluation by a neutral, but occurs in a less formal
atmosphere. A Government counsel surveyed by the author noted that "when compared
with other forms of ADR, the Mini-Trial is frequently viewed as being very high on the
formality scale.
. just short of formal litigation".
Another reason for not selecting the Mini-Trial is that both parties may want to
pursue a binding resolution which the Mini-Trial does not produce After a contract
dispute has gone on for a considerable amount of time, parties often seek to find finality of
the issue and agree to a Board of Contract Appeals (BCA) Summary Trial or binding
Arbitration. Both of these ADR techniques involve an abbreviated presentation to a third
party who has the authority to render a binding decision. The Summary Trial also can be
used when a question of law is involved. In other cases, parties with good working
relationships may be more comfortable with other dispute resolution techniques such as
unassisted negotiations. One BCA judge surveyed by the author commented that
unassisted negotiations had been utilized in ". .. approximately a dozen of these [cases]
with all but two resulting in a settlement".
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Other reasons cited for not choosing the Mini-Trial include: lack of familiarity with
the Mini-Trial, parties only interested in neutral evaluation or fact-finding, excessive
preparation costs, issues that are too insignificant to warrant a Mini-Trial's preparation,
and one side's inability to find a suitable senior management principal. Of particular
interest, one former Government employee stated that senior Government managers often
choose other forms ofADR that allow "someone else" (a judge or arbitrator) to make the
decision so that "higher-ups can buy into the decision without risking their careers".
G. SUMMARY
This chapter introduced the ADR technique known as the Mini-Trial and briefly
discussed its evolution within Government contracting. The Mini-Trial's advantages and
disadvantages, as well as factors for and against its use were examined in detail. The
chapter also explored the timing at which a Mini-Trial should be utilized and a number of
the most common reasons for selecting alternative dispute resolution techniques other
than the Mini-Trial. The next chapter will analyze in detail the major players and format
of the Mini-Trial.
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IV. KEY ELEMENTS OF THE MINI-TRIAL
A. INTRODUCTION
No two Mini-Trials are organized exactly the same. Their format, scope, and
timing are all determined by the parties involved in the dispute. [Ref. 18, pg. 1] Despite its
uniquely tailored structure, most Mini-Trials include the following events: [Ref. 18, pg. 9]
1
.
Initiating the Mini-Trial process.
2. Selecting Management principals.
3. Selecting a neutral third party.
4. Agreeing to the format and rules of the Mini-Trial.
5. Conducting some amount of discovery.
6. Exchanging position papers.
7. Presenting both parties' case at the Mini-Trial.
8. Negotiating by Management Principals.
9. Documenting any agreement reached.
This chapter will discuss in detail each of these Mini-Trial events.
B. EVALUATING THE POSSIBLE USE OF THE MINI-TRIAL
Either party involved in a contract dispute can recommend the usage of the Mini-
Trial to resolve their differences. The suggestion to use the Mini-Trial most often comes
from the attorneys representing parties. [Ref. 18, pg. 10] However, an increasing number
of clients are now suggesting the use of the Mini-Trial due to greater awareness of the
technique and its advantages over litigation. [Ref. 21, pg. 3] Within the Army Corps of
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Engineers, senior Corps managers often discuss the Mini-Trial option directly with the
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the contractor involved in the dispute. [Ref. 18, pg. 11]
The Corps' managers believe that senior managers are practical people who are more than
capable of resolving their differences.
During pre-conference hearings, many Board of Contract Appeals judges,
including judges serving on the Armed Services Board, the Engineering Board, and the
General Services Administration Board, emphasize that parties have the option of using
ADR (to include the use of the Mini-Trial) to resolve their differences. [Ref. 21, pg. 4]
One of the Board of Contract Appeals judges surveyed by the researcher commented that
when the ADR option is presented to parties, they are often "enthusiastic about
suggestions that might save time and effort and promote a swift, informal resolution of the
dispute."
Regardless of whether or not a dispute has been filed with a Board of Contract
Appeals, both parties must voluntarily agree to use the Mini-Trial. [Ref. 18, pg. 2] In
cases filed with a Board of Contract Appeals, both parties "shall jointly request the ADR
in writing" with the Board's clerk. [Ref. 21, pg. 4]
C. SELECTING AND PREPARING PRINCIPALS
1. Selecting a Principal
According to the Army Corps of Engineers, the first of two basic criteria for
selection of senior management principals is that the principal should not have any prior
involvement in the dispute. [Ref. 18, pg. 12] The rationale behind this first criterion is that
prior involvement may bias the principal against objectively evaluating both parties
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presentations. If the principal can not objectively evaluate the presentation, he will most
likely be unable to agree on a compromise settlement.
The second criterion is that the principal have the authority to bind his organization
by his decision. [Ref. 18, pg. 12] If a principal lacks the necessary authority, any
agreement he reaches will be only tentative and subject to being overruled by more senior
management. The Mini-Trial will only work if both sides know the other's principal "can
make decisions that will count."[Ref 18, pg. 12]
2. Analysis
Based on this research, the Corps' basic criteria for selecting principals appear
sound. The use of principals from upper management with requisite authority and without
negative pre-dispositions eliminates biases that can impede resolution. However, the
researcher believes two additional criteria should be considered. The first of these is the
amount of time the potential principal has available to devote to the case. If a principal
has limited amounts of time to prepare for the case or is subject to be called away midway
through the Mini-Trial, he should not be considered as a potential candidate. The second
consideration is the potential principal's personality. Several Mini-Trial success stories
note the principal's personality as being one of the most important ingredients in a
successful Mini-Trial. Traits often mentioned in these stories include a willingness to
compromise, receptiveness to new alternatives, the ability to develop mutual trust and
respect, and a good sense of humor. These traits can help set the tone for proceedings
and help overcome difficulties encountered.
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3. Preparation of the Principal
Ideally, the principal should be a subject matter expert so they are more able to
understand both parties' positions. [Ref. 18, pg. 12] Unfortunately, this luxury is not
always available and the principal must be thoroughly prepared to participate in the Mini-
Trial. The principal should be thoroughly briefed on his party's position and best points
arguments, the position and arguments of the opposition (obtained through the exchange
of position papers), the monetary limits of his authority, and applicable points of law that
may pertain to the dispute. [Ref. 39, pg. 7] A Government contracting official surveyed by
the researcher stated that principals generally receive summary briefings from the attorney
representing them and their lower level staff . They can also be briefed by expert
witnesses on more complex technical issues. Another Government official surveyed noted
that if sufficient time was not available to adequately brief the principal, the principal may
be at a serious disadvantage during the Mini-Trial.
D. USE OF A THIRD PARTY NEUTRAL
1. Possible Roles For Neutrals
A neutral advisor has been utilized by the Army Corps of Engineers during every
successful mini-trial, proving themselves invaluable. [Ref. 18, pg. 17] The idea behind
using a neutral is to introduce an impartial opinion and an element of mediation into the
mini-trial. [Ref. 39, pg. 1] Neutrals are often retired judges and lawyers with subject-
matter expertise in the field of the dispute. Using a neutral can help overcome suspicion
or animosity, provide a communication link between the parties, facilitate continued
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conversation at impasses, and encourage the principals to take charge of the
situation. [Ref. 18, pg. 12] In addition, several Government contracting officials surveyed
by the researcher commented that suggestions coming from the neutral may also be
viewed with more openness than suggestions coming from the opposing side. When paid,
neutrals are usually compensated equally for their efforts by both parties. [Ref. 13, pg. 18]
The role of the neutral should be defined prior to the Mini-Trial. [Ref. 26, pg. 3]
Neutrals serve at the will of the parties and can fill a variety of roles including the
following: [Ref. 18, pg. 12]
a. Point out the strengths and weaknesses of each party's positions.
b. Advise how a judge and jury might interpret law or a party's position.
c. Suggest new ways of resolving the dispute or recommending unexplored
settlements.
d. Facilitate discussion between parties.
e. Help establish the mini-trial agreement document and procedures. [Ref. 7,
Pg24]
f. Clarify the worth of parties' claims and assist in negotiating quantum.
g. Deflate unreasonable claims and stubborn opinions.
h. Explain the rationale for a solution which makes it easier for both sides to buy-
in to the solution because the rationale was proposed by one of the parties.
i. Engage in ex parte (private consultation) discussions with parties. [Ref. 21, pg.
9]
2. Survey Results For Neutral Roles
A survey conducted by the researcher asked what the most effective role for a
third party neutral in a Mini-Trial should be. Three distinct groups were targeted: active
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or retired judges of Boards of Contracting Appeals (BCA), Government attorneys and
contracting personnel, and private attorneys. Of the BCA judges surveyed, the most
effective roles were the following (in order):
a. Facilitate discussion/keep parties talking.
b. Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each party's position.
c. Ensure parties viewed the neutral as unbiased/had confidence in the
neutral
d. Ensure parties follow the agreed upon process.
Nearly every judge surveyed included the above roles as being important. Other effective
roles for neutrals mentioned were: innovative thinking, maintaining a sense of humor,
keeping parties focused on compromise, mediating if necessary during the post-
presentation negotiations, and being a legal expert.
Unlike the BCA judges who were relatively consistent in their responses, private
attorneys surveyed were not as unified in what they believed were the most effective roles
for the neutral. The most common responses received were the following (in order):
a. Focusing parties on common ground/compromise.
b. Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each party's position.
c. Facilitate discussions/keep parties talking.
d. Acting as a mediator.
Private attorneys also recommended the following additional roles for neutrals:
maintaining order and decorum, assisting in the structuring of the ADR agreement, acting
as a sounding board for parties who wish to engage in ex parte discussions,
maintaining/building confidence in the neutral's ability, and asking questions to draw out
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responses. One innovative private attorney suggested that "if asked, [the neutral should]
give a reasonable settlement (dollar) range to the parties". This would help narrow the
differences between the parties and provide "buy-in" by the parties' respective senior
management.
The Government attorneys and contracting personnel were more consistent in their
responses to the survey, citing the following roles as the most important (in order):
a. Facilitating discussion/keeping parties talking.
b. Evaluating strengths and weaknesses of each party's position.
c. Providing legal interpretation.
d. Acting as a mediator.
Other recommendations included: forcing parties to be reasonable in negotiating,
participating in ex parte discussions, building confidence in the neutral's ability, judging
how a court might rule on the case as a whole, and assisting in the drafting of the ADR
agreement. In addition, a Government ADR specialist commented that if a BCA judge is
acting as the neutral, their "general authority as a judge is often useful in persuading the
parties to continue negotiations where they otherwise might decide to terminate [the Mini-
Trial]". Finally, another Government attorney with significant Mini-Trial experience
stated that the neutral should "only [act] as a facilitator to keep things moving. . the
neutral should not be an evaluator because if evaluation was needed, we would use the
Third Party Evaluation technique".
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3. Analysis
Despite the wide range of responses received to the question, there is some
consensus as to what the most effective roles of the neutral should be in a Mini-Trial.
Most individuals surveyed agreed that the neutral should facilitate discussions, and
evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each side. A neutral facilitating discussions
keeps parties talking and focused on the issues at hand. Since the neutral is (hopefully)
viewed as unbiased, he is in a unique situation to objectively evaluate both parties'
positions. After these two points, there is little agreement between the parties as to the
most effective roles for the neutral.
Interestingly, the BCA judges surveyed were more concerned than other groups
about following the ADR agreement and ensuring the neutral was viewed as unbiased.
This is most likely because BCA judges, among the groups surveyed, are most often called
upon to act as third party neutrals. As BCA judges, one of their many responsibilities is
to ensure the appeals process is followed. In addition, every judge (or judge acting as an
ADR neutral) wants to be viewed as unbiased, this quality is extremely important in order
for a judge or neutral to be effective. Based on the survey results, the Government and
private attorneys seem less concerned with the process and the neutral's bias and more
concerned about the neutral's mediation skills.
After thorough analysis of the literature and survey results, it appears to the
researcher that there are four primary roles that should be filled by a neutral during a Mini-
Trial. The first of these is facilitating discussion. The neutral must keep the parties talking
and focused on coming to an agreement. Even when parties are having difficulties
communicating, the neutral's ex parte discussions with each party can assist in overcoming
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potential impasses. If the parties fail to communicate, the Mini-Trial process is doomed to
failure. The second role is evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of each party's
position. It is common for parties to be so entrenched in their position that they can not
objectively see the merits of the other party's position. The unbiased neutral can provide a
"dose of reality" by pointing out both the strengths and weaknesses of each party. If the
neutral is an active or retired BCA judge, he can also provide his opinion on the possible
outcomes if the dispute were to go before the board or court. The third role that a neutral
should fill is ensuring that he is perceived as being unbiased. Both parties must have faith
in his sense of fairness, as well as his impartiality. If his bias is questioned, the neutral will
cease to be effective. Although these three roles are crucial for a neutral to be successful,
the most important role a neutral should fill is whatever role the parties need him to fulfill.
If both parties agree to limit a neutral's participation to only facilitation, that is the only
role he should fill. If the parties later want him to fill some other role, such as evaluation
of strengths and weaknesses of each side's position, the Mini-Trial provides that flexibility.
It is important for the neutral to always remember that he is serving at the will of the
parties.
4. Choice of Neutrals
Once the parties have decided what role (or roles) they want the neutral to fulfill,
they must jointly choose the neutral. [Ref. 3 1, pg. 27] Based on the Administrative
Dispute Resolution Act of 1990, Government agencies are authorized to use the services
of Government employees, employees of other Government agencies, and private persons
to serve as neutrals. [Ref. 3 1, pg. 28] Government neutrals are most often active Board of
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Contract Appeals (BCA) judges, however, they can also be Federal mediators, technical
experts, or any other acceptable Government employees. Private neutrals are usually law
professors with significant experience in the issue at hand or are former Board of Contract
Appeals judges. [Ref 18, pg. 12]
Choosing a Board of Contract Appeals judge as a Mini-Trial neutral offers a
number of advantages over private neutrals, including the following: [Ref. 36, pg. 455-
457]
a. Most judges have considerable experience and sound credentials.
b. A judge is recognized as an expert in handling Government contract disputes.
c. A judge who handles an ADR proceeding is disqualified from participating in
any follow-on litigation should the ADR fail to resolve the dispute.
d. A judge would be able to advise parties if the issues presented did in fact
contain an important precedential issue of law (if so, ADR should not be
chosen).
e. Judges are familiar with positions that the Board has taken with respect to
various issues.
f. Judges are highly cost-effective; in most Federal disputes, they are free.
Government and private attorneys surveyed by the researcher also added the
following advantages for choosing BCA judges as neutrals: they have a lengthy public
record of rulings available for analyzing, many have received extensive mediation and
negotiation training, and they already have "good jobs" so they are less likely to be trying
to use a ADR proceeding to build a reputation for future personal gain.
Despite the many advantages of using a BCA judge as a neutral, they pose several
potential disadvantages compared with private neutrals. The same individuals surveyed
above cited the following disadvantages:
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a. Some judges do not know how to "take off their judge hat" and allow the
parties to decide the issues.
b. Many judges have little or no ADR experience.
c. Some judges feel uncomfortable with the mediation and negotiation roles they
will have to fill in ADR. Not all judges make good mediators because
mediation requires different skills and perspectives.
d. One of the parties may view the BCA judge as biased based on their public
record.
e. Some judges are viewed as less innovative and unwilling to embrace novel
concepts.
No advantages to using a private neutral were found in the researcher's literature
search, however, individuals surveyed by the researcher commented that private neutrals
offer more innovative perspectives and better business judgment than BCA judges. In
addition, one private attorney surveyed added that 'if selected on the basis of experience,
reputation, and track record for success, [a private neutral] may prove to be an
exceedingly effective neutral".
Even when considering their few advantages, private neutrals present several
important disadvantages. Private neutrals can be very expensive, often charging thousands
of dollars for their professional services. [Ref. 36, pg. 460] Several Government attorneys
and surprisingly, a few private attorneys surveyed by the researcher noted that private
neutrals can be perceived as being biased against the Government, especially "since the
private sector is where their [private neutral's] 'bread is buttered'". Other disadvantages
cited by individuals included a possible lack of familiarity with financial limitations on
Federal agencies and lack of mediation training and unfamiliarity with ADR techniques.
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5. Analysis
Based on analysis of the advantages and disadvantages for both active Board of
Contract Appeals (BCA) judges and private neutrals, it appears to the researcher that
active BCA judges may be the best choice for Mini-Trial neutrals. Judges are inexpensive,
provide a wealth of experience resolving contract disputes, and have unquestionable
credentials. Although private neutrals may have strong credentials, their mediation
experience and knowledge of Federal contracting may be lacking. A judge's public record
of previous decisions is readily available for scrutiny, allowing both parties to determine if
the judge has any existing biases. A private neutral's record for resolving disputes may
not be publicly available or clear.
Despite the perception of some small contractors that BCA judges are biased
against business, most contractors who have dealt with BCA judges are familiar with their
track record of relatively unbiased decisions. Even if a judge is believed to have a bias
towards one side or another, either party can request another available judge. In the case
of a private neutral, any bias the neutral may have will only be heard through the
"grapevine" prior to trial, or discovered during the trial.
BCA judges resolve contract disputes regularly and maybe in the better position
(than private neutrals) to predict the outcome of a dispute that has recently come before
the board. Based on comments received from the survey, their ability to predict possible
outcomes carries a great deal of weight with parties when a judge evaluates their position.
Survey responses also suggest that a judge's stature also facilitates "buy-in" when possible
solutions are recommended by the judge or are passed along by the judge. With the
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exception of recently retired BCA judges acting as private neutrals, private neutrals may
not have the same recent experience to accurately predict what decision a board may
decide in a given case.
Despite the many advantages of using BCA judges as neutrals, private neutrals
may be the best choice in some circumstances. Several survey participants stated that
some judges are less innovative and unwilling to embrace novel concepts. If one of the
parties is looking for an innovative solution to the dispute and believes private neutrals are
more innovative than BCA judges, they may prefer having a private neutral. Furthermore,
if the contractor has little experience with BCA judges, it may perceive a BCA judge as
being "pro-Government." In this case, using a private neutral may remove the
contractor's fear of the neutral being "pro-Government."
E. THE MINI-TRIAL AGREEMENT
1. Purpose and Recommendations For Drafting the Mini-Trial Agreement
The purpose of the Mini-Trial agreement is to establish the procedures to be
followed during the discovery and hearing phases of the Mini-Trial. [Ref 39, pg. 6] The
parties will jointly formulate the agreement and tailor it to the needs of the parties. [Ref.
13, pg. 21] Parties drafting a Mini-Trial agreement should take into account the following
recommendations: [Ref. 6, pg. 7]
a. Have a written agreement on the process, procedures, schedule, and
termination of the Mini-Trial.
b. Decide on the role of the third party neutral and decide whether to permit
parties to have communications with the neutral without the presence of the
other party (i.e. ex parte discussions).
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c. Decide whether, and the extent to which, to suspend litigation. Also determine
ifthe suspension is indefinite or linked to a specific event or date.
d. Address what information or types of information and documents are to be
provided. Also, address whether there will be any restriction placed on the use
of the information and documents.
e. Include provisions to ensure the confidentiality of findings and documentation.
f Address how the parties intend to obtain and, or, limit discovery and factual
exchange.
g. Establish page and supporting documentation limits of each party's position
paper. Describe how papers will be exchanged and if any written rebuttal to
each party's position paper will be made. Determine if the neutral will be
provided advanced copies of the parties' position papers and rebuttals.
h. Provide the name of each party's senior management principal, and the names
of any technical, legal and business representatives. Determine if any
limitations will be placed on the number of witnesses and representatives.
i. Determine at what point the principals should begin the post-presentation
negotiation.
j . Make provisions and preparations for the execution of a bilateral contract
modification at the conclusion of the Mini-Trial process.
If the parties have a need to add, delete, or change any element of the Mini-Trial
agreement, they may mutually alter the agreement at any time. Examples of possible
alterations can include changing the role of the neutral or page limitations on position
papers.
2. Exchange of Position Papers
Position papers summarize the assertion of each party and are exchanged prior to
the trial. [Ref 18, pg. 14] The length, character, and due date of position papers generally
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will be spelled out in the Mini-Trial agreement. Position papers vary in length, but are
normally limited to 20-25 pages, keeping in mind the best points concept. [Ref. 18, pg. 14]
The exchange of position papers reveals each party's strongest arguments for their
respective position. The position papers should also reflect what information will be
presented during the trial. [Ref. 26, pg. 4] Once the opposition's paper is received, each
party can fine tune their presentation and arguments.
Another reason for the preparation of position papers is to pre-brief the
neutral. [Ref. 21, pg. 9] One Board of Contract Appeals judge surveyed by the researcher
noted that he always requests a copy of both sides' papers in order to get "up to speed" on
the parties primary arguments. In addition, witness lists (if applicable) can also be
exchanged with the position papers. [Ref. 48, pg. 23] The exchange of position papers
shortens the length of the Mini-Trial by covering basic positions which will not need to be
covered in detail during the trial presentations.
3. Mini-Trial Schedule
As noted above, the tailored schedule for the trial is documented in the Mini-Trial
agreement. Although there is no standard format, most Mini-Trials follow the sample
schedule listed below: [Ref. 18, pg. 15]
• Party A's opening remarks
• Party B's opening remarks
• Party A's presentation
• Party B's rebuttal (may include cross examination)
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Questions from principals (and neutral if allowed)
Party B's presentation
Party A's rebuttal (may include cross examination)
Questions from principals (and neutral if allowed)
Closing arguments from both parties
Negotiations/discussions by principals (usually assisted by the neutral)
4. Best Points Arguments
The Mini-Trial agreement normally contains some language that commits both
parties to present their best points or case and to negotiate in good faith. [Ref. 18, pg. 14]
The term best points or case means that the parties will only focus on those issues that are
the most important and relevant to resolving the dispute. Negotiating in good faith implies
that both parties will attempt to make their best effort to come to a compromise
agreement. It also implies that a party will not use the Mini-Trial as a 'stalling tactic' to
gain some future advantage in court. [Ref. 18, pg. 14] Like the exchange of position
papers, best points presentations are used to condense the presentations down to the
minimum amount of time necessary.
5. Location of the Mini-Trial
Although not necessarily required, the Mini-Trial should be held in a location that
is clearly neutral and not associated with either party. [Ref. 18, pg. 14] This measure is
necessary to ensure that neither party can benefit in some way from the location. The
trial should also be conducted away from the office so all parties can concentrate on the
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Mini-Trial case without distractions. [Ref. 26, pg. 2] Visitors and interruptions due to
other 'outside' business should be curtailed as much as possible. Both parties should be
given adequate seating and tables to handle all exhibits and equipment. In addition, both
parties should be provided with a private conference room for case preparation and
discussions. [Ref. 26, pg. 2] Above all, an informal atmosphere should prevail; this will
help both sides be comfortable and more relaxed. [Ref. 18, pg. 14]
6. Allocation of Expenses
In most cases, "all expenses such as the cost of the neutral advisor or the meeting
facilities, are paid for on a 50/50 basis by the participants. "[Ref. 18, pg. 15] Only under
unusual circumstances will the Government bear more than half of the expenses. [Ref. 13,
pg. 18] Although unusual circumstances occur infrequently, an example might be when
the contractor can not afford to share his portion of the neutral's fee and the Government
agrees to pay for the entire cost of the neutral. All costs associated with the preparation
and presentation of the Mini-Trial are paid for by each individual party. [Ref. 18, pg. 15]
F. THE MINI-TRIAL HEARING
As discussed earlier, the trial will follow the schedule in the Mini-Trial agreement.
Opening statements are made, "spelling out in outline form the premise of [each party's]
case, the method to be used in proving your case and the fallacy of your opponent's
case". [Ref 26, pg. 4] Following opening remarks, parties can structure their
presentations in any manner they desire, selecting among witnesses, documentary and
demonstrative evidence, and audiovisual and exhibit presentations. [Ref. 39, pg. 8]
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anyone within their organization to present their position. Survey participants noted that
in disputes involving highly complex, technical issues, technical experts are often called
upon to either present their party's position or supplement the information provided by
attorney presenting the case. Due to concerns regarding confidentiality and/or
distractions, parties may elect to limit the number of individuals participating in the Mini-
Trial. Due to time limits normally placed on presentations, it is imperative that parties
condense their arguments and presentations to fit within the time allotted. Presentation
lengths vary depending on the number and complexity of the issues in dispute, as well as
other outside events such as travel plans and pending litigation dates. Survey participants
commented that presentation lengths vary widely, lasting anywhere from two hours to two
days for each party's presentation.
Visual aids and exhibits can play a crucial role in presentations. As one BCA judge
stated, "you only have one shot of probably three hours to convince someone of the
validity of your position. . visual presentations have great impact under these time
constraints". [Ref 26, pg. 4] Although there is a great deal of latitude given to each party
in their presentations, "both attorneys need to be aware that for there to be any payment
made by the Government, there must first be a legal basis for any costs, expenses, or
injuries which are claimed". [Ref. 18, pg. 17] Testimony may be required by auditors to
establish a legal basis.
Principals are usually free to ask questions of anyone participating in the trial in
order to clarify their understanding of facts and opinions. [Ref. 16, pg. 8] Neutrals may
also ask questions if authorized to under the terms of the Mini-Trial agreement. If time
permits, cross examination may also be allowed if stated in the Mini-Trial agreement.
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However, cross examination may not be effective under time and schedule
constraints. [Ref. 26, pg. 5] Due to the flexibility of the Mini-Trial process, the parties can
mutually change the format or the role of the neutral at any time during the trial if they
believe it will help reach an agreement. Recesses or breaks may be necessary during
lengthy presentations or if a party feels it needs to confer privately on an issue. After
presentations are completed, parties conclude the trial with closing arguments. During a
recent U.S. Army Material Command Mini-trial, the Army's closing arguments stressed
not only its best points arguments, but also the risks of future litigation if the case was not
settled. [Ref. 20, pg. 6]
G. POST-PRESENTATION NEGOTIATIONS
At the conclusion of the trial, the principals (occasionally accompanied by their
lawyers) attempt to negotiate a settlement. [Ref. 12, pg. 1] After absorbing both parties'
arguments and positions, the principals have the opportunity to conduct face-to-face
discussions. Although principals have final decision making authority, it is not uncommon
for them to consult with their staffs during breaks in negotiations. [Ref. 26, pg. 5]
Negotiations are usually kept informal and follow no set format or length. [Ref. 18, pg. 17]
Once in the negotiation room, principals may conduct the negotiation any way they want,
so long as it helps contribute to resolving the dispute. [Ref. 18, pg. 17] Principals can hear
additional presentations on specific points if necessary. [Ref. 18, pg. 17] Negotiations can
take as little as an hour, while other negotiations can last several sessions spread over
several days. [Ref. 18, pg. 17]
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Depending on the role of the neutral, he may or may not be a part of the
negotiations. [Ref. 18, pg. 17] If included in the negotiation phase, the neutral can fill any
role desired by both parties. Since the neutral is often a subject matter expert or has
significant experience in resolving disputes, he will often be called upon to highlight major
points made by both parties, provide objective analysis of opposing views, and make
recommendations for possible settlements. Regardless of the role of the neutral, the
principals are the only ones who have the authority to resolve the dispute.
During the negotiation phase of a Mini-Trial involving the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers and General Roofing Company, the parties chose to expand the role of the
neutral beyond the original agreement. [Ref. 44] The parties allowed the neutral to
evaluate each claim and the dispute as a whole and to speak with each party on an ex parte
basis. The mutual expansion of the neutral's role is believed to have expedited
negotiations, allowing each party to discuss each claim on its merit and quantum.
Another example of effective use ex parte discussions can be found in the Army's
dispute with Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company. [Ref. 46] During negotiations, the
neutral met individually with each party to discuss the issues and act as a sounding board
for possible quantums. Realizing the parties were not far apart on the quantum, the
neutral was able to bring the parties to a successful resolution.
H. DOCUMENTING THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
Once a resolution has been reached through negotiations, the parties should
promptly prepare a written agreement that documents the "key ingredients" of the
settlement. [Ref. 4, pg. 11] Key ingredients include the dollar amount or quantum of the
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settlement, the date settlement payment will be made, a concise description of what the
parties agree to execute, and the impact of the settlement on on-going work. Prompt
preparation of the settlement agreement will ensure that both sides know what was agreed
upon in case there are later questions. In addition to prompt preparation, it is important
that the intent of the formal agreement be documented in as much detail as possible. [Ref.
26, pg. 5] More often than not, the principals "will develop an agreement in principle,
then request the attorneys to prepare more detailed agreements implementing the
agreement."[Ref 18, pg. 17]
I. SUMMARY
This chapter focused on initiating the use of the Mini-Trial, key aspects of the
Mini-Trial agreement, the flow of the trial, negotiations, and documentation. The
researcher also provided analysis of principal selection, the most effective roles played by
the neutral, and which category of neutral is the best choice for Mini-Trials. The next
chapter will explore and analyze issues surrounding the use of the Mini-trial including,
possible reluctance to use the Mini-Trial within the Department of Defense, problems
encountered with neutrals and principals, and the concept of an "unassisted" Mini-Trial.
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V. ISSUES IN THE USE OF THE MINI-TRIAL
A. U.S. NAVY RELUCTANCE TO USE THE MINI-TRIAL
1. Survey Results
Based on the initial literature search on the use of the Mini-trial, the researcher
found examples of the Navy's success with the Mini-Trial. However, most of these
published success stories involving the Navy occurred during the mid to late 1980's, with
only a few examples found after 1990. These initial findings led the researcher to question
whether the U.S. Navy was reluctant to utilize the Mini-Trial when compared with the
other Services. Unfortunately, there are no conclusive data available on each Services'
use of the Mini-Trial. In order to determine if the Navy was reluctant to use the Mini-
Trial, the researcher surveyed over thirty Board of Contract Appeals (BCA) judges,
Department of Defense attorneys, and private attorneys. Several individuals surveyed
were unable to address the question due to their limited knowledge of the Navy's ADR
usage. Of those able to address the question, two were BCA judges, six were
Government attorneys, and two were private attorneys.
Both BCA judges responding to the question stated that the Navy was not
reluctant to use the Mini-Trial, and had used it extensively in past contract disputes. One
judge commented that "when compared with the Army's Corps of Engineers, the Navy
has not used the Mini-Trial as much. . but not any less than the other Services." The
judge also stated that he believed the Navy's usage ofADR had increased due to recent
legislation promoting the use of ADR. Both judges agreed that all of the Services were
choosing other forms ofADR over the Mini-Trial. The second judge said that most of the
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Services (including the Navy) "have not rushed off to use the Mini-Trial" since other less
complex forms ofADR are available.
For the most part, Government attorneys also agreed that the Navy has not been
reluctant to use the Mini-Trial. Several attorneys from the Navy Litigation Office
emphatically stated that the Navy was "eager to engage in ADR" and had actively used the
Mini-Trial and ADR since the early 1980s. One Navy attorney surveyed stated that "the
Navy used to use the Mini-Trial extensively but has now moved on to other less formal
ADR methods such as Mediation". This greater propensity to use less formal techniques
echoed earlier comments made by the BCA judges surveyed. Despite the Navy's apparent
eagerness to participate in ADR, two Navy attorneys commented that recent problems
involving a third party neutral had made the Navy "somewhat hesitant" to enter into Mini-
Trial proceedings. Problems involving Mini-Trial neutrals will be discussed in greater
detail later in this chapter. Of the six Government attorneys responding, only one believed
the Navy was "not as eager to use ADR as [other Services] may have". However, the
attorney noted that "if an activity had a very high number of claims and virtually no
prospect of winning [the dispute], it would eagerly embrace ADR... fortunately, we [the
Navy] are not in that position."
Of the two private attorneys responding to the question, one believed the
Government (including the Navy) was "still reluctant to use ADR and the Mini-Trial
despite the increased promotion ofADR" within the Government. Furthermore, he
commented that the "Government shows interest [in the Mini-Trial and ADR], but [its]
talk is cheap." The other attorney surveyed believed the Navy was not reluctant to use the
Mini-Trial and utilized it just as much as the other Services.
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2. Analysis
When the Mini-Trial first gained wide acceptance as an effective ADR technique in
the early 1980s, it was used extensively by the Department of Defense. The researcher
believes the Mini-Trial provided a 'familiar', more formal structure similar to traditional
litigation. Attorneys felt comfortable with this technique and readily adopted it.
However, once attorneys became more comfortable with other, less formal ADR
techniques, such as Mediation and Negotiation, their reliance on the Mini-Trial diminished.
It appears that this "diminished reliance" on the Mini-Trial is exactly what occurred within
the Navy. The Navy used the Mini-Trial extensively during the 1980's as highlighted by
the many success stories found by the researcher. However, its appears that its usage
decreased as Navy attorneys became more familiar with less complex techniques. As one
surveyed Navy attorney noted, "the Navy has used the Mini-Trial when it thought it was
appropriate." Although the Navy uses the Mini-Trial infrequently, it was successfully used
in resolving an $ 1 8 million dispute between the Naval Sea Systems Command and
Westinghouse Electric Corporation in 1996[Ref 3] The researcher believes the Navy
selectively chooses when to use the Mini-Trial and only uses the technique when its
advantages can be best utilized.
It is also interesting to note that of the Government attorneys surveyed, only Navy
attorneys from the Navy Litigation Office responded to the question. . Their partisan
"bias" may account for their general consensus that the Navy has not been reluctant to use
the Mini-Trial. Regardless of any possible bias by Navy attorneys, comments by the BCA
judges and the private attorney surveyed further support the researcher's preliminary
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conclusion that the Navy has not been reluctant to use the Mini-Trial. The researcher can
only speculate as to why the other Government attorneys surveyed did not respond. It
appears they had little insight about the Navy's use of the Mini-Trial. From conversations
with numerous Government attorneys, the researcher discovered that other Services and
Federal agencies were generally unfamiliar with the Navy's experience with the Mini-Trial.
B. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED WITH NEUTRALS
1. Survey Results
Although the guiding role of a third party neutral is to assist the parties in resolving
the dispute, the neutral can sometimes be a source of problems during the Mini-Trial
proceeding. The researcher's survey included a question regarding the problems
encountered with neutrals. Unlike the low response rate received to the previous question
concerning the perceived reluctance of the Navy to use the Mini-Trial, nearly every Board
of Contract Appeals (BCA) judge and Government and private attorney surveyed
commented on problems they had heard of or had personally encountered.
The number one problem with neutrals cited by BCA judges was the cost involved
in hiring a neutral. Since BCA judges acting as neutrals are provided free of charge, the
judges surveyed were primarily referring to the expense encountered with hiring a private
neutral. Since private neutrals can charge upwards of $ 200 per hour, services for a
neutral can easily exceed $ 8,000 per week. Even though this cost is usually split 50-50
with the contractor, this cost still must be paid for out of current fiscal year's funding
which is often limited. The judges also mentioned that the cost for a neutral could be
"cost prohibitive" if the total dollar value of the dispute was small. An example of cost
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prohibitive would be paying $ 8,000 for a private neutral when the total amount of the
dispute was only $ 50,000. Other problems with neutrals noted by the judges included not
accepting their role as a neutral (as outlined in the agreement), losing their objectivity by
not allowing the parties to resolve the dispute themselves, and the lack of appreciation for
the role of the evaluative mediator. Some neutrals feel so compelled to resolve the
dispute, that they occasionally try to participate more than the parties originally intended.
This can cause frustration for the parties who are not only trying to resolve the dispute,
but are also forced to keep the neutral within his original role. Occasionally, a neutral can
lose his objectivity after hearing both parties' positions. This may lead the neutral to
unknowingly influence the dispute's outcome in favor of the party he sides with. If tasked
by the parties, a neutral might also have a problem with providing an objective evaluation
of the parties' positions. Unlike BCA judges who are regularly called upon to evaluate
parties' positions, some neutrals may not feel comfortable evaluating parties' positions.
Private attorneys surveyed noted that their greatest problem with neutrals during
Mini-Trials was that the neutral did not have adequate knowledge of Government
contracting and was unfamiliar with settlement funding options available to the
Government. A neutral's lack of familiarity with Government contracting forced the
parties to spend valuable time educating the neutral; time that should have been spent
resolving the dispute. By not understanding settlement options available to the
Government, neutrals were often times recommending possible solutions that were not
feasible or even legal. Other problems with neutrals noted by the private attorneys
included lack of impartiality, the limited number of qualified neutrals available, and the
cost of the neutral if time limits were not placed on their participation. A neutral can lose
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his impartiality if he is biased against one party's position. As discussed earlier, this may
lead the neutral to influence the decision in favor of the party he sides with. The private
attorney's concern with the cost of neutral is well founded. If no time limits are placed on
a private neutral's participation, the neutral could spend unnecessary time "milking the
clock" in order to receive a greater fee. Time limitations places a cap on the total cost of
the neutral.
Concern over the neutral's bias was the number one problem with neutrals cited by
Government attorneys surveyed. Furthermore, over 75 percent of Government attorneys
surveyed said that neutrals tended to be more pro-contractor than pro-Government. The
second largest response received was the neutral overstepping his role in the Mini-Trial,
followed by the expense of the neutral and lack of familiarity with Government
contracting. Examples of a neutral overstepping his role may be providing evaluation of
the parties' position without being asked to or attempting to facilitate negotiations when
his assistance is not necessary. Other problems with neutrals cited by the Government
attorneys included BCA judges who acted more like "judges, than facilitators and
mediators, and neutrals pressuring the parties to resolve the dispute to boost up their own
"track record" as a neutral.
2. Analysis
After reviewing the responses, all three groups expressed concern over the
impartiality and cost of the neutral. The reason for consensus on the impartiality of the
neutral can be found in the fundamental role of the neutral. The neutral is supposed to
provide unbiased assistance to help resolve the dispute. If a neutral had a perceived bias
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towards one of the parties, the other party would lose faith in the neutral's ability to
objectively assess the strengths and weaknesses of each party and would question any
resolution recommended by the neutral. Although most BCA judges believe that they are
impartial, they do see the need for both parties to perceive them as being fair and
objective. One would expect that by nature of their role, attorneys are biased towards
their party's position, however, they realize their party can succeed only if the neutral
gives each party the same opportunity. In addition, some attorneys may also harbor
negative views towards the use ofADR and blame the neutral's impartiality as the reason
for any problems that may occur during the trial.
The consensus regarding the cost of neutrals found that both parties are always
concerned with the costs of resolving the dispute. If there is a fee associated with the
neutral (as in the case of a private neutral), both parties will want to minimize that
expense. Every dollar spent on neutral fees reduces a corporation's profits and the already
tight balance of the Government settlement fund. Since BCA neutrals are free, there is a
natural tendency to use a BCA judge over a private neutral. The most common comment
stated "why should you pay for a neutral when you can get one for free."
Beyond concern over impartiality and cost, there was no further consensus among
all three groups. Two of the three groups, the BCA judges and the Government
attorneys, were concerned with the neutral overstepping his role. Most of the
Government attorneys surveyed were Navy attorneys. Of these, most were familiar with
problems the Navy has recently had with a few Mini-Trial neutrals (both BCA and private
neutrals) who had overstepped their authority. These recent problems most likely tainted
their responses. Unfortunately, some neutrals are more concerned about trying to resolve
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the dispute to bolster their "career record" rather than looking out for both sides' best
interests.
Most of the BCA judges surveyed were also familiar with the Navy's recent
problems. This may account for why they responded the same way to the question. In
addition, many BCA judges are willing to admit that they occasionally have difficulty
"taking their judges hat off' and may have inadvertently overstepped their own role as a
neutral some time in the past. Surprisingly, the private attorneys surveyed did not mention
the neutral overstepping his role as a concern. This may be due to the limited number of
Mini-Trials in which those attorneys had participated. Most of the private attorneys
surveyed had only one or two experiences with the Mini-Trial.
Another explanation for the concern over the neutral stepping outside his role may
be due to an entirely different reason. As discussed previously, the role of the neutral is
usually defined by the parties in the Mini-Trial agreement. However, some parties may be
unsure as to what role they want the neutral to fill and fail to adequately define the role of
the neutral in the agreement. If his role is vaguely defined, the neutral may well interpret
his role in any manner he wants, which may not be to the liking of the parties.
Consequently, Government attorneys and BCA judges may be concerned about this
"overstepping" because the attorneys who draft agreements may have failed to adequately
define the role of the neutral.
Both Government and private attorneys were concerned with the neutral's lack of
understanding of Government contracting. The reason for this may well be that when a
neutral is not well-versed in Government contracting, the attorneys are often called upon
to educate the neutral. Since this inevitably slows the Mini-Trial process down and
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interrupts the presentations (which are usually made by the attorneys), attorneys would
prefer having a neutral who has considerable knowledge of the Government contracting
process. This is another reason for using a BCA judge as a neutral. Since a BCA judge
has considerable knowledge of Government contracting, an attorney does not have to
spend time "educating" a BCA judge.
One of the problems with neutrals cited by the BCA judges was particularly
interesting. They noted that some neutrals lack the appreciation for the "evaluative
mediator" role of the neutral. Assuming this is a role the parties want the neutral to fulfill,
some neutrals fail to understand the importance of providing each party with an
"evaluation" of the strengths and weaknesses of their cases. The neutral's viewpoint on
the dispute may help both parties to more objectively view their own position, which may
lead to a compromise solution. If the neutral does not provide his opinion and an impasse
has occurred, both parties will most likely remain entrenched in their positions and the
dispute will not be resolved. The BCA judges may hold this concern because they
personally feel more comfortable providing their opinion since they regularly do so when
making Board decisions. Private neutrals, who are not regularly asked to render decisions
(as BCA judges are), may be more reluctant to provide their opinion on each of the
parties' strengths and weaknesses. When asked for such an opinion, they may over
emphasize the strengths or the weaknesses of a party, unknowingly provide a biased
assessment of a party's position, or may avoid providing an evaluation altogether.
BCA judges noted that the second part to the "evaluative mediator" was the
importance of the neutral's role as mediator. A few BCA judges admitted that being a
judge does not necessarily make a person a good mediator. Although most judges do
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possess strong mediator skills, these unique skills must be learned, not just assumed to be
held by virtue of a judge's position.
C. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED WITH SENIOR MANAGEMENT
PRINCIPALS
1. Survey Results
As discussed in Chapter IV, the role of the principal is to listen to each party's
presentation, objectively evaluate the material presented, and conduct negotiations with
the opposing party's principal. Most individuals selected as neutrals are well-versed in the
facts of the case, competent, objective, and possess sound business judgment. These
individuals should also have the authority (up to some dollar amount) to settle the case.
The same three groups ofBoard of Contract Appeals (BCA) judges, Government
attorneys, and private attorneys were asked by the researcher what the most common
problems encountered with senior management principals were during Mini-Trials.
Overall, most of the individuals surveyed noted that they had personally encountered few
problems with senior management principals. Although some individuals had not
experienced problems with principals, they knew of and shared problems encountered by
their contemporaries.
When asked what the most common problems associated with principals were,
BCA judges resoundingly agreed that it was the principal's lack of authority to settle the
dispute. Without the requisite authority to settle the dispute, any agreement made by the
principal would have to be approved by someone senior to him. If the principal has to ask
for approval of his decision, his initial agreement is subject to overruling which
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undermines the Mini-Trial's (and ADR's) purpose of providing a relatively quick means of
resolving a dispute. Judges cited other problems regarding principals as well. The
principal was too busy and unwilling to devote the requisite time to resolve the case, was
not objective and too emotionally involved in the case, and was not adequately prepared
for the trial.
Private attorneys surveyed by the researcher claimed that the principal's reluctance
to make a decision is the greatest problem encountered with principals. Several attorneys
noted that many principals were concerned that if they made a decision that was
perceived as "wrong", it may have a negative impact on their career. The second most
frequent problem cited was the principal's lack of authority to settle the dispute. Other
problems with principals cited by the attorneys included the principal's lack of time to
devote to the dispute, lack of ability to compromise, poor preparation caused by lack of
access to the principal, and resentment from lower level personnel for the principal's role
in resolving "their" dispute. Senior managers have numerous responsibilities that occupy
their time. If the time the principal has to devote to the dispute is very limited, they may
not be adequately prepared for the Mini-Trial. It is not surprising the private attorneys
mentioned this as a problem since they are often called upon to prepare the principal for
the Mini-Trial. If the principal has been too involved in the earlier stages of the dispute,
he may be too entrenched in his opinions to compromise with the opposing party. In
addition, the principal's may not have a compromising personality. Any time senior
management is called upon to resolve a dispute, lower level personnel may resent the
principal's participation in a dispute they believe should be handled at their level. Lower
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level personnel may believe that the principal does not fully understand the details of the
dispute and will compromise on issues that they believe should not be compromised.
Government attorneys provided the greatest number of varying responses when
asked what problems were encountered with principals. Over three quarters of the
attorneys surveyed cited the principal's lack of time and unwillingness to devote the
necessary time as the greatest problems. The attorneys believed that many principals did
not consider their role as principal as their primary priority. The second most frequently
obtained response was the principal's lack of authority to settle, followed by the lack of
available preparation time for the principal. Other problems with principals cited by the
attorneys included the principal's unwillingness to keep the presentation team informed,
unwillingness to compromise, lack of "feel" for the dispute, lack of acceptance of the
principal by the other side, and difficulty in finding an objective, non-emotional principal
with negotiation skills. One Government attorney also believed that many "corporate"
principals were biased and unable to be objective.
2. Analysis
There is a great deal more consensus on the problems encountered with principals
than with the problems with neutrals discussed earlier. All three groups surveyed by the
researcher cited the following problems with principals:
a. Often too busy and unwilling to devote adequate time to resolve the dispute.
b. Often lack the necessary authority to settle the dispute.
c. Lack of sufficient preparation time.
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It is not surprising to the researcher that all three parties cited the principal's
general lack of preparation time and unwillingness to devote the necessary time to resolve
the case. Senior managers frequently hold a plethora of responsibilities which demand a
great deal of time and energy. Since few (if any) "spare" managers are available to act as
Mini-Trial principals, prospective principals are usually performing their normal tasks and
responsibilities when called upon to be a principal. Most managers can not afford to
"drop everything" to work on the Mini-Trial and usually end up devoting only a small
percentage of their time to Mini-Trial preparations. Since both Government and private
attorneys are responsible for preparing their respective principal, they are most likely to
become frustrated by the lack of available preparation time.
The unwillingness by some principals to devote the necessary time is likely due to
the on-going demands of the organization. Unless the organization relieves the principal
of all other responsibilities, the manager will have to juggle his normal work schedule and
deadlines around trial preparations. When posed with balancing normal job requirements
and short-term trial preparations, most managers would allocate most of their time to their
primary responsibilities In addition, a busy manager may not have wanted to be the
principal and may resent his new, unexpected assignment. If this were the case, a manager
may make a half-hearted effort in preparing for the trial.
For a Mini-Trial to be successful, the principal must have the requisite authority to
settle the dispute. As all three groups noted, a principal without authority will have to
receive approval from more senior management. The Mini-Trial may be doomed to failure
if the principal is unable to receive necessary approval. The other party which bargained
in good faith, believing it had an agreement, would believe it had wasted its time and
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would most likely pull out of any future negotiations. This would force the dispute to be
decided at the Board or in court. To avoid this scenario, most neutrals require each party
to certify that they have the needed authority to settle the dispute. One BCA judge
commented that he "does not even begin the trial proceedings without ensuring both
parties have the proper authority."
Two of the three groups, the BCA judges and Government attorneys, noted that
the unwillingness of the principal to compromise was a problem. There are several
reasons why a principal may be unwilling to compromise. Some principals are too familiar
with their party's position to be objective. Even if the other party's presentation shows
some valid points, the principal can not overcome his belief that his side is without fault.
Other times, the principal is not able to compromise for fear of being seen by his trial team
and by senior management as too cooperative. If the principal gives even an inch, he
believes he is perceived as being weak.
Another reason that may explain why Government attorneys believe some
principals are unwilling to compromise can be found in the natural rivalry between
principals and lawyers. In a Mini-Trial, the attorneys are responsible for the presentation
of the material, however, the principal has the ultimate authority to settle the issue. Some
attorneys may dislike handing over control of the outcome to the principal. If the
attorney is anti-ADR and the Mini-Trial has not been successfully negotiated, the attorney
can lay blame for its failure on the principal's unwillingness to compromise.
A fourth reason for not compromising is concern that the ultimate settlement will
be viewed by senior management as "selling the farm" - the idea that the principal gave up
too much. In this situation, the principal simply does not compromise, thereby avoiding
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any potential backlash and second guessing from senior management. This possible
reason for unwillingness to compromise ties in well with what the private attorneys said
about the principal's reluctance to settle. Concern over possible career ramifications may
lead some principals to avoid making a tough decision. When the principal avoids settling
the dispute, he ensures that "someone else", probably a BCA or court judge, will decide
the issue. The researcher was surprised that the Government attorneys did not mention
any reluctance on the part of Government principals to make the tough decisions
especially in light of future General Accounting Office (GAO) reviews. This may be due
to Government agencies empowering their principals to make the best sound business
decision possible.
A few Government attorneys surveyed believed that it is difficult to find a good
negotiator to act as a principal in the Government. The researcher finds it hard to believe
that there are not many highly qualified negotiators in the Government. It is more likely
that what the attorneys are saying is the process the Government uses to select its
principals does not produce the optimal principals. Particularly in large disputes, a
principal is selected based on his position, seniority, and or rank, not based on his
negotiation skills. Just because a potential principal is a member of the Senior Executive
Service (SES), a Flag officer, or a technical expert, it does not mean he will be a skilled
negotiator. The researcher believes that if the Government puts as much time into
selecting its principal as it does in selecting its neutrals, there would be no problem with
finding principals with strong negotiation skills.
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D. THE UNASSISTED MINI-TRIAL
1. Discussion
While exploring the Navy's use of the Mini-Trial, the researcher came upon an
interesting concept known as an unassisted Mini-Trial. Based on conversations with a few
Government attorneys, the unassisted Mini-Trial essentially follows the same format as the
normal Mini-Trial described in Chapter IV, however no neutral is utilized to assist the
parties in reaching a resolution. Although lacking a neutral, the parties in an unassisted
Mini-Trial still sign an ADR agreement, exchange position papers, make presentations to a
panel made up of party principals, and conduct negotiations following presentations. The
Navy has used this technique when a neutral could not be found that was satisfactory to
both parties. The researcher surveyed BCA judges, and Government and private attorneys
to determine the rationale and utility of the unassisted Mini-Trial. Of those who had heard
of this hybrid Mini-Trial, most agreed that the rationale for using it was that both parties
were confident that they could reach a resolution without assistance. Furthermore, they
believed that the unassisted Mini-Trial might be used when simple factual presentations
were enough for parties to determine a quantum.
Every BCA judge surveyed commented that the unassisted Mini-Trial was merely
an elaborate unassisted "negotiation" and that this technique had little or no value.
Several judges said that the unassisted Mini-Trial had had little success in resolving
disputes. One judge's comment sums up most of the BCA judges' opinions, "it does not
hurt using a neutral. . .no Mini-Trial should fail for want of a neutral." The response
received from private attorneys was similar to the response received from the judges.
Every response was, for the most part, negative towards the use of the unassisted Mini-
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Trial. Most of the attorneys commented that a good neutral was vital in order to settle
tough cases and two of the attorneys called it a "contradiction in terms". The opinion of
one attorney was shared by most of the other attorneys, "In most circumstances, [neutral]
assistance is needed unless a presentation of facts in summary format will in itself
convince... decision-makers of what is the correct resolution of the dispute."
Government attorneys surveyed were more divided in their responses on the utility
of the unassisted Mini-Trial. Two thirds of all Government attorneys surveyed believed
the unassisted Mini-Trial was not an effective technique without the assistance of a
neutral. However, those who favor the use of the unassisted Mini-Tria! said it was a
"good negotiation process", assuming parties were willing to negotiate and compromise.
When only Navy attorneys were considered, the responses were split, half favoring its use
while the other half believing it had no value. An attorney at the Navy Litigation Office
explained the reason for the split. He said that the mixed responses were most likely due
to their office's recent success in two unassisted Mini-Trial cases.
2. Analysis
Based on analysis of each parties' responses, it is understandable why each party
responded the way they did. Because most BCA judges are proponents ofADR and
regularly act as third party neutrals in ADR proceedings, they will most likely favor a
Mini-Trial proceeding that relies on the skills that a talented neutral can bring to a trial.
Furthermore, unless a BCA judge had prior Government or private practice experience
with the unassisted Mini-Trial, judges may not be in the best position to objectively
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evaluate this technique. Any knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of such a
technique would be based on second-hand information or on their own speculation.
If the judges had more exposure to some of the success stories, their responses may have
been more favorable towards the unassisted Mini-Trial. Regardless, BCA judges have a
great deal of experience with disputes and ADR, so their lack of enthusiasm for the
technique may be well founded.
The Government and private attorney responses were generally negative, with the
exception of the Navy Litigation Office contingent. Many of the attorneys (both
Government and private) had little or no experience with the unassisted Mini-Trial, so it is
not surprising to the researcher that they question the technique's utility. Despite the
Navy's success with the unassisted Mini-Trial, only half of the Navy attorneys responded
favorably towards the unassisted Mini-Trial. More than likely, every attorney in the Navy
Litigation Office had recently heard of its use and success, but still some were not
convinced of the technique's usefulness. The researcher can only speculate as to why
some Navy attorneys still did not favor the technique. The answer could be that these
attorneys saw its limited usefulness since the Navy only used the unassisted Mini-Trial
when both parties could not agree on a suitable neutral. Another answer maybe that
despite its limited success (only a few cases have been successfully resolved), the
unassisted Mini-Trial is not established enough to be fully supported by these attorneys.
A third answer may be that these attorneys simply prefer having a third party neutral
available to assist the parties as needed.
When exploring the unassisted Mini-Trial, no published advantages or
disadvantages for this technique were found by the researcher. Exploring these pros and
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cons might help explain why the majority of survey respondents did not favor the use of
the unassisted Mini-Trial. Based on analysis of the Mini-Trial and the unassisted Mini-
Trial, the researcher formulated the following advantages of the unassisted Mini-Trial:
a. Provides a satisfactory option in the event that the parties can not agree on the
selection of a neutral.
b. Saves money that would be spent on hiring a private neutral (assumes BCA
judges are free).
c. Provides structure to the exchange of information between parties.
d. Allows only the parties to influence the outcome of the dispute since no neutral
is present. A neutral's perceived "agenda" will have no impact.
e. Expedites the process, by possibly, eliminating the administrative time required
for the parties to find a neutral. This time may be better spent on resolving the
dispute.
f Works well if both parties feel confident that the decision-makers can maintain
control of the proceedings and can compromise.
Despite the advantages listed above, the researcher would suggest the following
disadvantages of the unassisted Mini-Trial:
a. The burden of breaking deadlocks, maintaining order, formulating innovative
and alternative solutions, and keeping the parties focused on the issues will fall
squarely on the shoulders of the principals.
b. There will not be an objective third party evaluation of each party's position.
c. Its success is based on the condition that both principals are cooperative and
willing to compromise. If the principals are combative or well entrenched in
their respective side's position, they may be less than willing to look for
"common ground".
d. It may prolong the trial and negotiations since there will be no neutral
"driving" the discussions.
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After considering its advantages and disadvantages, the unassisted Mini-Trial has
some utility. The researcher has determined that the unassisted Mini-Trial is best used in
situations where the parties have a strong long-term relationship and are willing to
compromise. It can provide a structure to the exchange of information and may expedite
settlement if both principals are able to work well together. However, the unassisted
Mini-Trial may overly burden the principal with responsibilities normally performed by a
neutral. Only the strongest, most capable of principals will be able to handle this burden.
In addition, without a neutral, there will be no objective evaluation, which can often inject
a sense of realism into a party's positions. When weighing the advantages and
disadvantages of the unassisted Mini-Trial, it appears to the researcher that the advantages
a neutral brings to the proceeding far outweigh any disadvantages he may present. This
weighing of pros and cons may explain the negative feelings many of those surveyed had
towards the use of the unassisted Mini-Trial.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter focused on the a number of issues surrounding the Mini-Trial. The
researcher explored his perception that the Navy was reluctant to use the Mini-Trial.
Problems associated with the participation of principals and neutrals in the Mini-Trial were
also analyzed. Finally, the researcher examined the utility of the hybrid Mini-Trial
technique known as the unassisted Mini-Trial. Chapter VI will analyze the most effective
usage of the Mini-Trial and its measures of success. It will also identify barriers that may
make it difficult to convince contractors to participate in the Mini-Trial and how the
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Government might overcome these barriers. The chapter will conclude with an
examination of the Mini-Trial's future as a form of ADR.
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VI. ANALYSIS OF THE MINI-TRIAL
A. INTRODUCTION
In Chapter V, several issues surrounding the use of the Mini-Trial were examined.
The researcher explored the perception that the Navy was reluctant to use the technique.
After analyzing survey opinions, the researcher found that the Navy had no reluctance to
use the Mini-Trial and merely selectively chose when to use the technique. The Chapter
also explored problems encountered with third party neutrals and senior management
principals during Mini-Trials. After examining the problems with neutrals and principals,
the researcher examined the Navy's use of the Unassisted Mini-Trial. Chapter VI will
continue to study issues involving the use of the Mini-Trial. The researcher will explore
the measures of success for the Mini-Trial, as well as examine how the Navy could most
effectively utilize the Mini-Trial. This section will be followed by an examination of the
barriers that exist to convince contractors to use the technique. The chapter will conclude
with a discussion of the Navy's future use of the Mini-Trial.
B. MEASURES OF SUCCESS OF THE MINI-TRIAL
1. Survey Results
Despite the plethora of material written about the Mini-Trial and ADR, no
published material was found by the researcher addressing the measures of success of the
Mini-Trial. By simply looking at the advantages of the Mini-Trial discussed earlier in
Chapter III, the reader may believe the measures of its success are whether the dispute
was resolved, and whether there were savings, in terms of cost and time, over traditional
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litigation. As with all ADR techniques, the main goal of the Mini-Trial is to resolve the
dispute. Consequently, it makes sense that if the parties settle the dispute, the Mini-Trial
can be considered successful. Furthermore, cost and time savings are usually advertised
as the biggest advantage of pursuing ADR over litigation. Therefore, if the parties saved
time and money, the trial would also be considered a success. Despite these elementary
answers, the researcher believes there are several other measures of success for the Mini-
Trial.
The researcher's survey asked Board of Contract Appeals (BCA) judges, and
Government and private attorneys to provide their opinions regarding the Mini-Trial's
measures of success. The BCA judges commented that the best measures of success of




2. Saves the parties money.
3 Narrows the issues in the event that the parties were unable to resolve the
dispute.
Four of five judges surveyed agreed that resolving the dispute was the most important
measure of success. One judge went so far as to say that from his perspective as a neutral,
"the only measure of success [for a Mini-Trial] is settlement". However, he did add that
from the parties' perspective, there may be other measures of success. In terms of cost
savings, three judges commented that cost savings should be compared to the agency's
"cost ceiling" (the amount the agency would have been willing to pay to resolve the
dispute). If the dispute is resolved for less than the cost ceiling, the Mini-Trial should be
considered successful. If the dispute is resolved for an amount greater than the ceiling, the
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Mini-Trial should be viewed as unsuccessful. Other measures of success cited by the
judges included time savings (when compared to the time it would take to get a Board or
court decision), and partial resolution of the dispute.
Private attorneys surveyed provided the greatest number of different responses to
the question on measures of success. They believed the most important measures of




2. Saves the parties money.
3. Saves the parties time, (tie)
3. Preserves the parties' long-term relationship, (tie)
As expected by the researcher, all of the attorneys surveyed believed that resolving the
dispute was the most important measure of success, followed by savings in time and
money. These top three responses are identical to those received from the Government
attorneys listed below. Preservation of the parties' long-term relationship also placed high
in order of importance. One attorney surveyed said that if the relationship is still good or
has gotten better after the trial (regardless of its outcome), the Mini-Trial was a success.
Other measures of success cited by the attorneys included the parties' satisfaction that a
"reasonable" settlement was achieved, the freeing up of the witnesses' time from months
or years of discovery and trial preparation to weeks or months, narrowing of the issues,
and giving the parties an opportunity to have their "day in court" (they had their chance to
tell their side of the story). In addition, another attorney believed that a Mini-Trial was
successful if the rationale for the settlement could be defended. If the decision could be
proven as a sound business decision, it must be a successful Mini-trial.
79
The top three survey responses received from the Government attorneys were
similar to those received from the BCA judges and private attorneys. The Government
attorneys believed the most important measures of a successful Mini-Trial were the




2. Saves the parties time.
3 Saves the parties money, (tie)
3. Narrows the issues if the parties are unable to resolve the dispute, (tie)
3. Both sides were satisfied that a "reasonable' settlement was achieved, (tie)
Nearly every attorney surveyed agreed that resolving the dispute was the best measure of
success. They also placed a great deal of emphasis on saving both time and money and
narrowing the issues. Other measures of success cited by the Government attorneys
included preservation of the parties' long-term relationship, partial resolution of the
dispute, and the expediting of the discovery process. In regards to preserving the parties'
long-term relationship, two optimistic Government attorneys commented that even if both
sides gave the Mini-Trial their "best effort" but failed to reach resolution, the parties might
retain or even foster a stronger relationship. They suggested that this stronger relationship
may help the parties reach a negotiated settlement even after the Mini-Trial
technique has failed.
2. Analysis
All three groups surveyed concur that resolution of the dispute, and time and cost
savings are important measures of success. As stated earlier, resolution of the dispute is
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the primary goal of those participating in the Mini-Trial. If the parties did not want to
resolve the dispute, it is unlikely that they would waste their time and resources preparing
for the trial. The cost and time savings responses were predictable since these are the
"advertised" advantages of the Mini-Trial and ADR. Many of the individuals surveyed
may have actually saved money through their own experience with the Mini-Trial.
However, several of the individuals responding to the survey had little personal experience
with a "real" Mini-Trial. This leads the researcher to believe many of those citing cost and
time savings may have merely "mimicked" the standard advantages of the Mini-Trial as
measures of success.
As discussed earlier, preparation for the Mini-Trial consumes a great deal of time
and resources, even if discovery and witness preparation is limited. Preparation can last
up to several months. Since attorney "time" translates into attorney "fees", legal costs can
quickly mount, making the Mini-Trial a very expensive ordeal. The researcher is willing to
concede that the Mini-Trial is usually a shorter process than actual litigation, so "ball-
park" cost savings can be estimated if the Mini-Trial is successful. However, cost savings
can only be "estimated", not accurately determined. These savings also assume the Mini-
Trial process successfully resolved the issue. If the Mini-Trial fails, additional preparation
costs will be incurred and some duplication of effort may be required. It is also difficult to
predict what costs may have been incurred at the Board. During the detailed literature
search for this study, the researcher found no Government or private survey or study
results showing conclusive evidence of the Mini-Trial's or ADR's cost savings.
Regardless of the researcher's concerns over the estimation of cost savings and some
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responses possibly mimicking the Mini-Trial's advantages, it appears that these savings do
exist and can be roughly calculated if a Mini-Trial successfully resolves the dispute.
Of all of the groups surveyed, the BCA judges were the only group unconcerned
about retaining the parties' long-term relationship. When acting as Mini-Trial neutrals,
most BCA judges are concerned with filling the role delegated to them and helping the
parties reach a successful resolution. Since they are most concerned with resolving the
dispute, the parties' long-term relationship may only be an afterthought to the judges.
Another reason why the judges may not be concerned with the long-term relationship of
the parties is that their involvement with the parties ends with the resolution of the case.
After the dispute is settled, it is probable that the parties will have to continue working
together to complete the contract or work together on future contracts. This is
particularly true in the case of Defense contractors. With the defense industrial base
steadily declining in size, Department of Defense agencies and the smaller number of
Defense contractors will be working together more in the future. Realizing this, both
Government and private attorneys may better understand the importance of maintaining
good working relations between the parties. Conversely, damaged working relationships
will make future dealings difficult.
Unlike both groups of attorneys, the BCA judges were not concerned with the
parties reaching a "satisfactory outcome". This may be because "satisfactory" is a
subjective term. A "satisfactory outcome" to one party may not be a satisfactory outcome
to another. Another reason may be that, as discussed in the proceeding paragraph, judges
do not have to live with the outcome, so whether it is satisfactory or not is not their
concern. As one BCA judge commented, "each judge is only concerned with a settlement
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that is within a 'zone of reasonableness'. .
. so long as the settlement is within that zone,
judges won't say anything". Furthermore, BCA judges might simply believe that if the
parties voluntarily agree to settle the dispute, it is assumed the resolution was
"satisfactory" to both parties.
After reviewing all of the responses, the researcher observed that one possible
measure of success was missing. None of the group surveyed suggested that the parties
willingness to use the Mini-Trial again should be used as a measure of success. As
discussed earlier, the Mini-Trial is most frequently used in very complex cases that require
senior management attention. Since many disputes are not particularly complex and do
not necessarily require senior management participation, a party that had previously used
the Mini-Trial may not have a second opportunity to use it. Other parties who have
successfully used the Mini-Trial may not use it again due to its structure or may choose
another less formal method of ADR, such as Mediation or Negotiation. However, if the
parties showed a willingness to use the Mini-trial a second time, this willingness may
indicate that the parties have faith in the Mini-Trial's ability to help them resolve future
disputes. In other words, the parties would not use the Mini-Trial again unless they
believed it had been successful. An example may provide further clarification. If the
owner of a Honda automobile was willing to purchase another Honda after his old one has
worn out, this would most likely indicate that he was pleased with the earlier Honda. The
same could be said for the parties involved with the Mini-Trial. If the parties are willing to
use the Mini-Trial again, it appears that their previous experience with the technique was
successful.
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C. MOST EFFECTIVE USAGE OF THE MINI-TRIAL
1. Literature Review
To the best of the researcher's knowledge, there is no previously published study
that addressed how the Navy could most effectively use the Mini-Trial or ADR.
However, there are a few published articles and documents that describe what other
Government agencies have done to maximize their usage of the ADR. For instance, a
recent article about ADR recommends that agencies get their contractors to sign a letter
of commitment which expressly states that both sides will use "preferred alternatives to
litigation."[Ref 40, pg. 24-25] Another article suggests that a combination ofADR
awareness training for Contracting Officers (COs), Government attorneys, and Program
Managers (PMs), and publicizing ADR success stories will increase the usage of
ADR.[Ref. 15, pg. 54-55] The article's author believes that increased awareness training,
particularly for COs and PMs, will increase senior management's support for ADR. A
third article also recommends active support from senior management, extensive training
for attorneys, and awareness training for COs and PMs.[Ref 29, pg. 40]
Other documents recommended additional methods for maximizing the usage of
ADR. Based on their recent success with a Mini-Trial, the Navy produced a "Lessons
Learned" document which stated that it is important to ensure that adequate funds are
available "up front" to settle the dispute. [Ref 35, pg. 4-5] This recommendation was
included due to a funding problem encountered once their Mini-Trial was successfully
concluded. Another recommendation made in the "Lessons Learned" was to ensure the
principal provided "frequent consultation and briefings before a final settlement is reached
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to ensure that all parties will support the agreement". The rationale behind this
recommendation is by acquiring settlement approval, the principal avoids second-guessing
by senior management. An after-action report from the Army Materiel Command
suggested that in addition to awareness training for COs and PMs, the parties should
incorporate an ADR clause in their contract that "encourages contractors to request the
use of ADR."[Ref. 25, pg. 7]
2. Survey Results
Although the literature search provided general recommendations on the use of
ADR, only one document actually addressed how the Mini-Trial could most effectively be
used. In order to more specifically "hone-in" on the Mini-Trial, the same three groups
(BCA judges, and Government and private attorneys) were asked how the Navy could
most effectively utilize the Mini-Trial. All three groups surveyed believed that the Navy
could most effectively utilize the Mini-Trial by doing the following:
a. Conducting Mini-Trial awareness training for Contracting Officers, Program
Managers, and other senior management. Training might cover the Mini-
Trial's procedures, its advantages and disadvantages, and in what
circumstances it may be most successful.
b. Educating Navy and private attorneys on the use of the Mini-Trial. Training
might include discussing the Mini-Trial's structure, drafting of the ADR
agreement, convincing the opposition that the Mini-Trial is in their best
interest, and presentation techniques for the Mini-Trial.
c. Publicizing the Navy's success with the Mini-Trial.
d. Ensuring senior management is supportive of the Mini-Trial process, to include
empowering the principal to make the best business decision and not second-
guessing his decision.
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Beyond the above four recommendations, there was little consensus among the groups or
among individuals within each group. Other recommendations made by individuals
included publicizing the Government's policy of using ADR (and the Mini-Trial) to the
maximum extent practical, eliminating settlement funding problems (deciding which
Government organization will pay for the settlement and what type of funds will be used),
studying the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers successes and failures with the Mini-Trial,
selectively utilizing the Mini-Trial (realizing the Mini-Trial is not appropriate in all
disputes), including an ADR clause that requires the parties to attempt some form ofADR
prior to resorting to litigation, and tailoring each Mini-Trial agreement/process to fit the
individual dispute (not establishing "model" terms and conditions). One BCA judge also
recommended that the parties should incorporate a mechanism in the contract to allow the
neutral to unilaterally resolve the dispute if the parties failed to resolve the dispute
themselves. His reasoning was that if the contract included this "last-resort-arbitrator-like
provision", it might encourage them to try harder to resolve the dispute themselves.
3. Analysis
Despite its recent legislation and publicity, many Program Managers and
Contracting Officers are still uncomfortable with using Alternative Dispute Resolution to
resolve contract disputes. Without increased awareness ofADR and the Mini-Trial, they
will continue to doubt the effectiveness of ADR. In order to acquaint PMs and COs with
the advantages ofADR, awareness training is essential. Awareness training should also
include other senior management personnel who may be part of the decision-making
process. ADR and Mini-Trial training is also important for attorneys. The attorney's role
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in the Mini-Trial is primarily to present their party's position. As discussed previously, the
skills necessary to make an effective Mini-Trial presentation are different that those used
in formal litigation. As one BCA judge surveyed noted, "an effective Mini-Trial
presentation is different than a regular trial.
.
.it differs in length, detail, and presentation
style". The Mini-Trial requires the attorney to make an abbreviated best points
presentation, using easily understood language, not a lengthy, all-inclusive detailed
argument as would be used during litigation. Because the Mini-Trial requires a different
set of presentation skills, training is required to ensure that Mini-Trial attorneys have the
necessary skills to be effective.
Studying the U.S. Army's Corps of Engineers use of the Mini-Trial may be an
excellent source of lessons learned. Based on comments received from both Government
and private attorneys, the researcher believes the Corps of Engineers is generally
recognized as the leader in the Government use of the Mini-Trial. Due to their extensive
use of the Mini-Trial, the Navy could learn a great deal from the Corps' successes and
failures with the technique. The Corps has published over a half dozen Mini-Trial case
studies that analyze their use of the Mini-Trial. Studying the Corps' successes and
failures will help Navy attorneys selectively choose which disputes should be resolved
using the Mini-Trial. The Corps' case studies would also provide the Navy with ready-
made training tools to indoctrinate new attorneys on the advantages and disadvantages of
the Mini-Trial.
The Corps of Engineers does an excellent job of advertising its success with the
Mini-Trial. Although the Navy has experienced similar success with the Mini-Trial, little
is known about their success. The researcher believes that the Corps' success is due in
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part to their aggressive publicizing of their experiences with the Mini-Trial. Contractors
involved in disputes with the Corps are likely to enter into a Mini-Trial because they are
familiar with its structure, procedures, and ability to successfully resolve disputes. If the
Navy were to publicize its successes with the Mini-Trial, contractors may be more willing
to resolve their contract disputes with the Navy using the Mini-Trial. Since the Navy's
successful track-record with the Mini-Trial is not well known, contractors, as well as Navy
attorneys, may look to other forms ofADR to resolve disputes.
The recommendation to build a mechanism into the Mini-Trial agreement to allow
the neutral to decide the case if the parties are unable to is controversial. The researcher
sees several advantages with this recommendation. The first advantage of the mechanism
would be to ensure the dispute was resolved at the end of the negotiation sessions,
regardless of whether the principals resolved the dispute themselves. Assuming the
neutral's decision was binding, this arbitration-like mechanism would prevent the case
from going to court or a Board. By allowing the neutral to resolve the dispute, both
parties would save additional money and time that would have been spent if the dispute
were to continue. Another advantage may be that if faced with the possibility that the
neutral could end up resolving the dispute, the parties may try even harder to resolve the
dispute themselves. This scenario might occur if they are unsure how a neutral might rule
on the dispute. Allowing the neutral to make the final decision if the parties failed to come
to a settlement agreement would not be much different than if the dispute were to be
resolved later on by a judge in court or at the Board. Finally, if the mechanism was non-
binding, the neutral's decision may provide the "buy-in" necessary for both parties to
accept the resolution. However, the mechanism has a few shortcomings. If the neutral is
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permitted to decide the case, it may pose a barrier to convincing the parties to enter into
the Mini-Trial, especially if the neutral's decision was binding. As discussed in Chapter
III, one of the advantages of the Mini-Trial is that it ensures the parties retain control over
the outcome. If the neutral is permitted to resolve the dispute, the parties would lose that
control. A second problem with this mechanism is that it places the weight of the decision
squarely on the shoulders on the neutral if the parties can not resolve the dispute
themselves. A BCA judge might not have any problem with this responsibility since he is
regularly called upon to make such decisions. However, a private neutral with little
decision-making in his background may be uncomfortable with the responsibility.
In regards to the problems associated with settlement funding, if the contractor
expects significant delays (three or more months) in receiving its money, the contractor
may forego the Mini-Trial (or other ADR techniques) and seek quicker settlement funding
through the Board. There are basically two methods of funding settlements within the
Navy. The first method is to finance the settlement with the current fiscal year's money
from the program's budget. Although this may appear the best way to fund the
settlement, it can be problematic since few program budgets have cash reserves available
for funding settlements. A quicker, short-term method is to pay for the settlement using
the U.S. Department of Justice's Judgment Fund. If the Judgment Fund is used, the
settlement is paid by the Judgment Fund which is later reimbursed by the program's
budget. This method provides quicker payment and provides the Navy with more time to
determine how it will repay the Judgment Fund. If the Navy wants to avoid these funding
problems, it needs to know how it will fund the settlement (what organization will pay)
and which type of money will be used (current year program money or Judgment Fund).
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If the contractor knows there will be no delays in receiving a settlement, it may be more
inclined to enter into a Mini-Trial.
A "Lessons Learned" document from the Navy's participation in a recent Mini-
Trial suggested that the principal conducts frequent consultations with all parties prior to
settlement in order to ensure that senior management "buys-in" to the settlement
agreement. This recommendation was made to prevent "second-guessing" of the
principal's decision by senior management. Although second-guessing can be a problem,
the researcher believes that this upward briefing of the chain of command may undercut
the authority of the principal. Assuming the principal had the requisite authority and
funding limitations, the principal should be given the chance to decide what is in the
Navy's best interest based on the presentations and negotiations. By requiring the
principal to get "de facto" pre-approval of his decision, he is merely the mouth-piece for
senior management and is not a true decision-making principal. By not participating in the
presentations and follow-on negotiations, senior management has not gained the insight
into both parties' positions and is not in the best position to make the decision.
Furthermore, if the contractor realizes that any settlement made by the Navy's principal is
only tentative, requiring higher approval, the contractor may back out of negotiations
since they are not dealing with a principal who has the authority to settle the dispute.
Missing from both the literature and the survey responses is the need to carefully
choose the principal. As discussed in Chapter V, just because a potential principal is a
military flag officer or a member of the Senior Executive Service, it does not guarantee the
candidate will be an effective principal. In addition to having the requisite authority and
sound business judgment, a principal must have strong negotiation skills, be willing to
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compromise, be willing to devote the time to resolve the dispute, and be open to
alternative resolutions.
D. BARRIERS TO CONVINCING CONTRACTORS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE
MINI-TRIAL
1. Literature Review
Most Government documents and published magazine articles on ADR discuss
different ADR techniques, factors for using those techniques, and the steps various
Government agencies are taking to maximize the use of ADR. After reviewing numerous
ADR articles and documents, the researcher was able to find only one article that
addressed barriers to the use ofADR and none that specifically addressed barriers to the
use of the Mini-Trial. The article cited a recent Deloitte & Touche survey which
concluded that the greatest obstacle to ADR usage was the general lack of familiarity with
ADR techniques and their procedures among Government contracting professionals. [Ref.
6, pg. 8] It recommended ADR awareness training to overcome the lack ofADR
knowledge. Unfortunately, the article did not address which Government officials
(Program Managers, Contracting Officers, or attorneys) needed the awareness training.
Furthermore, the article did not discuss any barriers to convincing contractors to
participate in ADR.
2. Survey Results
Since no published information was found, the researcher asked the three groups
to cite what, if any, barriers existed to convince contractors to participate in Mini-Trials.
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Not surprisingly, all three groups had strong opinions on what barriers existed. However
several individuals, including over half the BCA judges and most of the private attorneys,
believed that it was harder to convince the Government to participate in the Mini-Trial
than it was to convince the contractor. The BCA judges surveyed believed that the




Government and contractors have the misperception that "everything" must be
litigated.
2. Government and private attorneys are trained to litigate, not to use ADR to
resolve contract disputes.
3. Contractor's attorneys lacked a detailed understanding of the Mini-Trial.
Over two thirds ofBCA judges surveyed commented that some contractors (and many
Government contracting professionals) had the attitude that they must go to court or the
Board for resolution. One judge believed this to be the case based on the way people have
been educated through television and the movies to believe that litigation "works". The
judge commented further that people "are convinced that they will prevail in
litigation. . .they want someone with authority to tell them that they are right and the other
party is wrong". A second judge stated that this attitude was caused by private attorneys
"hyping up" their clients on the probability of success in their case. By being too
confident in their future success, the client "can not believe they could possibly lose the
dispute". The judge's comments regarding attorney's lack ofADR training is a common
theme discussed earlier in this chapter. Attorneys know how to litigate but are less
familiar with abbreviated best points style of presentation required in the Mini-Trial. Since
the attorneys feel more comfortable with litigation, they may be steering their clients away
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from ADR towards litigation. Another barrier mentioned was the contractor's attitude
that "too much effort" has already been expended, so they (the contractor) might as well
go to court.
Several BCA judges pointed out that they believed contractors were more than
familiar with ADR and were more than willing to use the Mini-Trial and other ADR
techniques to resolve disputes. A few judges stated that the Government did not show a
strong enough willingness to use ADR and honor its settlement agreements. Others stated
that the Government had not thoroughly advertised its willingness to participate and its
success with the Mini-Trial. One judge noted that the "Government folks needed to be
convinced.
.
the contractors, more often than not, make the request for ADR". Based on
their survey responses, it appears the BCA judges (as a group) are not convinced that the
barriers that exist to use the Mini-Trial are solely the responsibility of the contractors and
their attorneys.
When asked what barriers exist to convince contractors to participate in a Mini-
Trial, most private attorneys commented that the greatest barrier to contractor
participation was the Government's unwillingness to commit to the process. Several
attorneys added that some contractors believed that the Mini-Trial (and ADR) was a
waste of time since they were unconvinced about the sincerity of the Government's
commitment. This attitude about the Government's lack of commitment was also found
among some BCA judges surveyed. In addition, many attorneys cited lengthy delays in
receiving settlement funding, as well as the Government's lack of publicizing its success
with the Mini-Trial as potential barriers to contractor participation. As far as barriers that
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When the contractor believes it has an "open and shut" case against the
Government, the contractor is unwilling to participate in the Mini-Trial or
other ADR techniques.
2. The contractor's party and attorneys believe the Mini-Trial is too structured
and expensive.
3 The contractors wanted to set a legal precedence and explore complex legal
issues.
The contractor's belief that it has an "open and shut" case against the Government is a
familiar theme echoed by the BCA judges. It appears that some contractors are so
convinced in their future success that they will forego ADR in anticipation of fairing better
at the Board or in court. As far as a contractor wanting to use a dispute to set
precedence or explore complex legal issues, neither the Mini-Trial nor other ADR
techniques should be used. As discussed in Chapter III, the Mini-Trial cannot be used to
establish legal precedence. Only a Board or court can establish precedence. Furthermore,
despite the Mini-Trial's ability to sift through complex factual issues, discussions
concerning complex legal issues should occur before a Board or court judge. Unless the
neutral is a BCA judge, a neutral may not have enough knowledgeable to discuss complex
legal issues.
Not surprisingly, most Government attorneys placed the blame for the barriers that
exist on the contractor themselves. The Government attorneys believed the greatest
barriers to convincing the contractor to participate in the Mini-Trial were the following:
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1.
Contractors and their attorneys do not have a good understanding of the Mini-
Trial.
2. Due to their lack of Mini-Trial (and ADR) knowledge, private attorneys guide
their clients away from ADR and towards litigation.
3. Contractors will only use the Mini-Trial and ADR only when they believe it is
in their "best interest".
Many of the Government attorneys surveyed by the researcher pointed out that their
private attorney counterparts were neither familiar nor comfortable with the Mini-Trial.
Like their private attorney counterparts, the Government attorneys commented that the
contractor was unwilling to commit to the process and had a preference for litigation. The
third barrier above indicates that some Government attorneys have a very cynical outlook
towards private attorneys representing contractors. One Government attorney
commented that "there are inherent barriers preventing us [Government attorneys] from
convincing them [private attorneys] to use any type ofADR. . . ." The attorney further
explained that if the Government suggests the use ofADR, the contractor automatically
believes ADR must not be in its "best interest". The harder the Government tries to
convince the contractor to use ADR, the more suspect the contractor will become of the
suggestion. Another attorney added that many contractors will participate in ADR only if
they believe they (the contractor) will fair better financially than going to court. This
comment may imply that the contractor is trying to obtain some financial gain to which it
is not entitled.
Despite the cynical outlook described above, a few Government attorneys
surveyed pointed out that the Government was responsible for some of the barriers. From
their experience, they believed that the contractors may be more willing to participate in
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ADR (and the Mini-Trial) than the Government. The attorneys explained that ADR was
cheaper and held the prospect for a quicker resolution of the dispute for the contractor
than formal litigation. Like their private attorney counterparts, a few attorneys agreed that
the lack of Mini-Trial success publicity by the Government, as well as problems with
settlement funding, were barriers to contractor participation.
3. Analysis
From the comments received by the Government and private attorneys, it appears
that both groups may be pointing fingers at the other for the barriers that keep contractors
from participating in the Mini-Trial. Private attorneys blame the Government for its
unwillingness to commit to the process, its poor publicity campaign of Mini-Trial
successes, and problems with timely settlement funding. On the other hand, Government
attorneys point out that the barriers are primarily caused by the contractor's lack of
understanding and their attorney's lack of training regarding the Mini-Trial. They further
added that some contractors participate in the Mini-Trial (and ADR in general) only when
they hope to obtain some financial gain to which they are not truly entitled. The
researcher believes this mutual finger pointing may be due to the natural bias each side has
towards the other. Neither side wants to lay blame solely on themselves for the barriers to
the contractor's participation in the Mini-Trial. Unlike both sets of attorneys, the BCA
judges struck a neutral position by blaming both sides for their lack ofADR training and
their leaning towards litigating "everything."
Even if the anti-Government comments of private attorneys are not considered,
there appears to be a common belief among many of the BCA judges and some
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Government attorneys that the Government has created many of the barriers and is more
hesitant to enter into the Mini-Trial and ADR than contractors. A few of the Government
attorneys who thought the contractors were more willing to participate suggested that
many contractors realize the value of using the Mini-Trial (and ADR). Both groups of
attorneys agreed that there were problems involving settlement funding, and the amount
of publicity the Government had given to its successful use of the Mini-Trial. This is not
to say that the Government is unwilling to participate in the Mini-Trial; merely that the
Government may play a large role in erecting barriers that dissuade contractors from
participating in Mini-Trials.
If there is indeed some amount of hesitation on the part of the Government, it may
be caused by the Government's belief that, in some disputes, the contractor is not entitled
to anything. As discussed early in Chapter III, for parties to compromise in a Mini-Trial,
both sides must acknowledge some amount of blame. In disputes where the Government
believes it is completely blameless, it makes sense that they are not going to compromise
where they believe no compromise is warranted. This line of thought might also explain
why one Government attorney mentioned that he believed many contractors participated
in ADR only because they (the contractors) will fair better financially with ADR than if the
dispute were to go to the Board or court. Government attorneys may also be hyping up
their clients into believing they have an "open and shut" case against the contractor when
in fact they do not. This may lead Government contracting officials to decide that ADR is
unnecessary since they will "undoubtedly" win at the Board or in court.
When researching the barriers that exist to convince contractors to participate in
Mini-Trials, few solutions were found. Without casting judgment for the cause of these
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barriers on either the Government or the contractor, the researcher believes that
Government action may help to limit the impact of these barriers. In order to overcome
these barriers, the researcher suggests the following solutions:
a. Conduct ADR awareness training for both Government contracting
professionals and contractors. The better both groups understand ADR and
the Mini-Trial, the more likely they will make informed decisions regarding its
use.
b. Conduct in-depth Mini-Trial training for Government attorneys. This training
may help attorneys better represent their clients and prepare stronger
presentations. If sufficient resources are available, the Government may also
consider providing this training to private attorneys on an "as available" basis.
c. Publicize the Government's success with the Mini-Trial as much as possible.
Greater publicity will help convince contractors and their attorneys that the
Government is willing and committed to the use of the Mini-Trial. Publicity
can come in the form of magazine articles, and lectures to civilian contracting,
law, and professional organizations.
d. Establish a policy to ensure settlement funds are paid promptly. If the
contractor knows settlement funding will be paid quickly, it will be less inclined
to opt for a Board or court decision.
e. Establish a central point of contact or ombudsman within each agency to
answer contractors' questions regarding the Mini-Trial and ADR. If tensions
were high in a dispute, this would provide the contractor the opportunity to
ask Mini-Trial or ADR questions without having talk directly to the
Contracting Officer or the field activity's attorneys.
f. Conduct face-to-face meetings between Government and contractor senior
management without the presence of either side's attorneys. An informal
meeting may give the Government the opportunity to convince its contractor
counterparts that the Mini-Trial (or other ADR technique) is in both parties'
"best interest."
If the survey responses of the Government and private attorneys are true indicators of how
the parties feel towards one another, no combination of solutions will remove the barriers
of suspicion and distrust that exists between parties. However, the solutions
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recommended by the researcher may convince more contractors to participate in the Mini-
Trial.
E. FUTURE USE OF THE MINI-TRIAL
1. Survey Results
A 1995 survey conducted by Deloitte and Touche found that 83 percent of
Government contracting professionals and 75 percent of private attorneys believe ADR
usage will increase in the coming years. [Ref. 27, pg. 2] Despite these promising results
for ADR's future, these findings do not necessarily mean that the Mini-Trial's use will also
increase in the future. A recent article about the Corps of Engineers Board of Contract
Appeals suggests that although there is a growing trend in the use ofADR to handle
disputes, there is also "a gradual progression from almost exclusive use of the Mini-Trial
to less structured facilitation and mediation."[Ref 36, pg. 467] In order to further explore
the Mini-Trial's future, the researcher asked the same three groups to predict the future
use of the Mini-Trial and to explain their reasoning.
When all of the groups' survey responses are combined, 52 percent believe the use
of the Mini-Trial will increase, 26 percent believe it will decrease, and the remaining 22
percent believe its use will remain stable. These preliminary figures suggest that the Mini-
Trial's use will increase in the future. However, when the combined group is broken
down further, the results are less conclusive. There was no consensus among either the
BCA judges or the private attorneys. Each group was split approximately 50-50, with
half of each group believing its use will increase, while the other half believing its use will
decrease. Each group also had a small handful of those who believe its use would remain
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stable. Only the Government attorneys surveyed believed that the Mini-Trial's use would
increase. Of those Government attorneys surveyed, 57 percent believe its use would
increase, 14 percent believe it will decrease, and 28 percent believe its use will remain the
same
Many of the Government attorneys who believe the Mini-Trial will be used more
often in the future cited the Mini-Trial's benefits as the primary reason for their belief.
They suggested that the Mini-Trial's ability to save the parties time, money, and resources
will convince parties in the future to use the Mini-Trial. The attorneys also stated that the
Mini-Trial enables the parties to work through conflict while preserving their working
relationship. A few attorneys suggested that BCA judges were recommending the Mini-
Trial more often during their pre-conference hearing as an alternative to a Board hearing.
One Government attorney suggested that the Mini-Trial will be used more often due to the
dollar size of the cases. He explained that although procurement funds and the number of
claims filed are shrinking, the dollar size of the claims were increasing dramatically. The
attorney cited the Navy's A- 12 aircraft dispute as an example of a recent "large dollar"
claim against the Government. With greater and greater amounts ofmoney involved, the
attorney believes that senior management will be more willing to get involved in the
dispute. Since the Mini-Trial maximizes the use of the senior management participation,
he believes senior managers will want to use the Mini-Trial more often in the future.
In addition to those reasons cited by the Government attorneys, two other reasons
were cited by BCA judges and private attorneys for the Mini-Trial's increased use in the
future. The first reason was that as Mini-Trial success stories receive greater attention
and publicity, the Mini-Trial's increased popularity will foster increased usage. The
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second reason was that the Mini-Trial (as well as other ADR techniques) is similar to
procedures originally envisioned for the Boards of Contract Appeals - a fair, inexpensive,
and expeditious method of resolving disputes. One private attorney noted that "the
Boards have adopted cumbersome, formal procedures that characterize litigation." He
further stated that the Mini-Trial , "when done right, can give both parties the feeling that
they have had their 'day in court'."
A number of reasons were cited by individuals from all three groups who believed
that the Mini-Trial will be used less frequently in the future. The most commonly cited
reasons were that the Mini-Trial was too complicated, too formal, and too expensive when
compared with other techniques such as mediation and negotiations. These responses
were similar to responses received to the question regarding barriers to convincing
contractors to participate in the Mini-Trial. Others suggested that as members of the
contracting community become more familiar and comfortable with ADR, they will
custom-design and tailor the ADR process to fit each dispute. Another individual
suggested that the Mini-Trial was an early "version" ofADR who's use will decrease as
other new techniques are developed. Finally, a few private attorneys believed that in an
era of downsizing, senior management did not have time to get involved with disputes.
This view is contrary to a Government attorney's comment which stated that senior
management could not afford not to be involved in large dollar claims.
2. Analysis
Due to the lack of consensus among BCA judges and private attorneys, the
researcher questioned why so many of the Government attorneys believe the Mini-Trial
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would be used more often in the future. The first explanation may have something to do
with the recent "push" by Government agencies to resolve disputes using ADR
Influenced by recent legislation such as the Administrative Disputes Resolution Acts of
1990 and 1996, most Government agencies have established ADR advocate positions as
well as written policies in order to promote the use of ADR. Due to these policy
statements, Government attorneys may feel pressured to maximize their use of ADR. This
explanation might explain a comment made by a Government attorney who said that he
felt pressured by senior management to use ADR. Another explanation might have
something to do with the group of Government attorneys surveyed. The group consisted
primarily of Navy and Army Corps of Engineers attorneys. These groups have
successfully used the Mini-Trial on numerous occasions. Because they are comfortable
and familiar with the Mini-Trial, they are more likely to use the technique than other
Government agencies less well represented in the survey. Several of the Navy and Corps
of Engineers attorneys surveyed have substantial personal experience with the Mini-Trial
and are also the ADR advocates for their respective organizations. The researcher is not
suggesting that their opinions do not count, but merely that they may have a bias towards
the Mini-Trial that other private attorneys and BCA judges do not have. A third
explanation may be that since the Navy and the Corps of Engineers attorneys have so
much experience with the Mini-Trial, they may be overly comfortable with the technique
and less willing to try more innovative ADR advancements. Using the automobile
example again, an owner who has good success with Honda automobiles will probably buy
another Honda in the future, even if another brand of automobile was just as good or even
better. The same might be said about the Navy and Corps of Engineers. Both have had
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so much success with the Mini-Trial, they may just want to stay with the ADR technique
that they are comfortable using. Private attorneys may have been split in their responses
for the exact opposite reason suggested above for the Navy and the Corps of Engineers.
Of the private attorneys surveyed, about half of them had some first-hand experience with
the Mini-Trial while the others had none. Since they are not as comfortable and familiar
with the Mini-Trial as the Navy and Corps of Engineers are, they may be more willing to
try new innovative ADR techniques in the future.
The question remains as to the Mini-Trial's future use. Both philosophical camps
have logical arguments for why they believe the Mini-TriaFs use will increase or decrease.
Those who believe the Mini-Trial's use will increase cite the Mini-Trial's benefits of time
and cost savings, as well as its ability to preserve the working relationships of parties
involved in the dispute. They also believe that future publicity and the increased need for
senior management involvement will increase its popularity and use. On the other side,
those who believe the Mini-Trial will be used less frequently state that it is too formal, too
structured, and too expensive when compared to other ADR techniques such as Mediation
or Negotiation. They also argue that in an era of downsizing, senior management does
not have the time to participate in a Mini-Trial and that new innovative ADR methods may
make the Mini-Trial a "thing of the past."
Although the researcher can see both viewpoints, the arguments presented by
those who believe Mini-Trial will be used less frequently appear to be somewhat lacking.
They state that the Mini-Trial is too formal and too structured and for some disputes, this
may be true. As discussed in Chapter III, not all disputes should be resolved using the
Mini-Trial. In those cases where a Mini-Trial is not necessary, other less formal, less
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structured ADR techniques can and are utilized. However, a Mini-Trial can be most
advantageous in those disputes involving complex factual issues and where a third party
neutral can help facilitate discussion and evaluate positions. As far as being too expensive,
the Mini-Trial is regarded as one of the more costly ADR techniques due to the amount of
discovery and preparation that is conducted, as well as the expense related to the use of a
third party neutral. Nonetheless, the Mini-Trial is frequently used as a "last resort" to
litigation and its discovery and preparation expenses would be incurred anyway if the
dispute were to go to a Board or court. As far as the cost of a third party neutral is
concerned, the parties usually split the neutral's fee in half. Even if the neutral's services
cost $ 10,000.00, each party would only pay $ 5,000.00 each, an amount that is easily
dwarfed by the dollar size of many claims against the Government. Furthermore, if the
size of claims against the Government are increasing dramatically, it appears to the
researcher that senior management would want to be more involved in resolving the
dispute, instead of allowing attorneys to control their organization's destiny. Finally,
although the Mini-Trial is an "ancient" technique when compared with other more recent
ADR advances, organizations are still looking towards it to successfully resolve their most
complex disputes. If these other newer, more innovative techniques are so much more
effective than the Mini-Trial, the Government would have surely utilized them in place of
the Mini-Trial.
F. SUMMARY
This chapter analyzed the most effective usage and measures of success for the
Mini-Trial. It also provided discussion and analysis of the barriers that exist to convince
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contractors to participate in the Mini-Trial. Based on the survey responses received, the
researcher recommended actions the Government might take to lessen the impact of those
barriers. The chapter concluded with an exploration and analysis of the Mini-Trial's future
use in Government contracting. Chapter VII will summarize the more important
conclusions reached in this thesis as well as answer the primary and secondary thesis
questions. The chapter will also make recommendations for the Government's future use
of the Mini-Trial and suggest other areas for further research.
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Vn. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
When used in the right scenario, the Mini-Trial works. It can provide both parties
with a fair and reasonable settlement without the risk of going before a Board or court.
The Mini-Trial allows parties the opportunity to work out their differences while
maintaining their working relationship. It can also save both parties a great deal of time
and money. Furthermore, the Mini-Trial allows the parties to retain the decision making
authority. The parties also receive the benefit of assistance from a third party neutral who
can fulfill any role desired by the parties. The neutral's role may include facilitating
discussion, evaluating positions, conducting ex parte discussions, and breaking impasses
during negotiations. Due to the flexibility of the Mini-Trial, the parties may mutually
agree to change the role of the neutral at anytime during the trial if it will help facilitate a
settlement.
Even though the Mini-Trial has been used successfully by numerous Government
agencies, it should not be considered a panacea for all contract disputes. Although it can
resolve large, complex, factual disputes, the Mini-Trial should not be used when either
party wants to establish a precedence, explore a difficult legal or policy issue, or use it as a
stalling tactic prior to litigation. Nor should it be used when unassisted negotiations could
more quickly resolve the dispute. However, once a Mini-Trial has been decided upon,
both parties must give their principals sufficient authority to settle the dispute. Without
authority, the principals' decisions will be subject to second guessing which may place the
negotiated settlement in jeopardy.
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The Mini-Trial is not a simple technique and should not be entered into lightly.
Both parties must agree on the trial's format as well as the choice and role of the neutral.
They must also prepare concise arguments and make best points presentations in language
that business decision-makers can understand. For attorneys preparing and presenting
their party's position, this is no simple task. The Mini-Trial also calls upon senior
management principals to devote significant amounts of time preparing for and
participating in the trial. For the negotiation phase of the trial to be successful, the
principals must objectively evaluate both parties' positions, show a willingness to
compromise, and negotiate in good faith. Despite its challenges, the Mini-Trial is an
effective and efficient method of resolving contract disputes. As the author of a recent
article noted, "With the creative and flexible use ofADR [and the Mini-Trial], contracting
professionals can achieve the goal of making procurement work better and cost less, as
well as making contracting more profitable." [Ref 6, pg. 13]
B. CONCLUSIONS
Conclusion # 1 : There are four primary measures of success for the Mini-Trial:
resolution of the dispute, cost and time savings, preservation of the parties' on-going
relationship, and willingness to use the Mini-Trial a second time.
Based on survey results received, the researcher concluded that there are four
primary measures of success for the Mini-Trial. The first measure of success is resolution
of the dispute. Resolution of the dispute is the primary reason the parties have attempted
to use the Mini-Trial and is the most obvious measure of success. Another measure is the
cost and time savings achieved by using the Mini-Trial. Even though the Mini-Trial
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requires a great deal of preparation when compared with other ADR techniques, it
requires far less time than if the dispute were pursued using formal litigation. Since the
time spent on a dispute translates into attorney's fees and the costs of other associated
personnel, the Mini-Trial's time savings translate into cost savings. Although there is little
hard data supporting the Mini-Trial's and ADR's actual cost savings, it is generally agreed
upon by ADR practitioners that ADR techniques save the parties money. A third measure
is whether the parties were able to preserve their on-going working relationship. If the
parties can still work together once the Mini-Trial has resolved the dispute, it must be
viewed as having been successful. The final measure of success for the Mini-Trial is
whether the parties would be willing to use the technique again to resolve a future
contract dispute. If the parties are not willing to use the technique again, the Mini-Trial
must not have been that much of a success.
Conclusion # 2: The conditions for the use of the Mini-Trial are the following: the
dispute is primarily factual., parties want to maintain control of the outcome, both parties
recognize some liability, a clear entitlement exists, the dollar amount of the dispute is
sufficiently large, the parties want to preserve their on-going working relationship, and
senior management is willing to devote sufficient time to the dispute.
As discussed in Chapter III, several factors or conditions favor the use of the Mini-
Trial. Since ADR and the Mini-Trial can not be used to establish precedence and should
not be used when important legal issues are at stake, parties should choose the Mini-Trial
when factual, not legal, issues are in contention. The Mini-Trial format also allows
senior management principals to control the outcome by retaining decision-making
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authority. Unlike Boards or courts where a third party judge resolves the dispute, senior
management principals representing both parties decide the outcome of the dispute.
Another condition for the use of the Mini-Trial is that both parties recognize some amount
of liability in the dispute. If one party was completely at fault for the dispute, it is unlikely
that the other party would choose to resolve the dispute using alternative dispute
resolution. By jointly acknowledging some amount of liability, the parties will be more
willing to compromise in order to resolve the dispute. A clear entitlement should also
exist. This condition is closely tied to the condition that both parties must recognize some
amount of liability. Since both parties recognize some amount of fault in the dispute, they
must also agree that one or both of the parties is entitled to compensation. The dollar
amount of the dispute must be sufficiently large to warrant the use of the Mini-Trial.
Although the researcher did not establish a "Go-No Go" amount for entering into a
dispute, it makes sense that if the amount of the dispute is relatively small, other less
expensive forms ofADR should be considered. The Mini-Trial is considered to be one of
the more complex and expensive ADR techniques. A further condition for the use of the
Mini-Trial is the parties' desire to maintain their on-going working relationship. If the
parties are forced to work together after the dispute is resolved, they may look to the
Mini-Trial to help them maintain the relationship. The Mini-Trial allows the parties to
work together to resolve the dispute. If the parties can resolve the dispute on their own,
their working relationship will remain amicable. The final condition for the use of the
Mini-Trial is that senior management supports the use of the Mini-Trial. With senior
management support, the party will be more likely to provide a strong principal to
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represent their side and will be less inclined to second-guess the settlement agreement of
the principal.
Conclusion # 3: Barriers exist when attempting to convince contractors to
participate in the Mini-Trial.
Based on the survey responses received, the researcher concludes that the greatest
barrier to convincing contractors to participate in the Mini-Trial is attorneys' lack of
knowledge or familiarity with the Mini-Trial's format and procedures. Since many
Government and contractor attorneys are more familiar with formal litigation, they tend to
direct their clients towards litigation, rather than the Mini-Trial or other ADR techniques.
The next largest barrier is the misperception that all disputes must be litigated. This
misperception is fostered by television shows and movies which glamorize litigation as
though it were the "best" way to resolve disputes. Closely tied to this barrier is the
problem of attorneys "hyping" up their clients as to the chances of success in court. If the
client is led to believe they are "right" and the other side is "wrong", they will be less
willing to participate in an ADR technique that will require them to compromise. Another
barrier that exists is the training received by attorneys. Few attorneys are trained to
participate in Mini-Trial or ADR proceedings. As discussed in Chapter VI, the skills
necessary to be an effective presenter in a Mini-Trial are not necessarily the same required
to be an effective litigator. If attorneys do no have the necessary skills to participate in a
Mini-Trial, they may be more inclined to direct their clients towards formal litigation
Another barrier is that many attorneys believe the Mini-Trial is too structured and
expensive to be effective. Although it is not a panacea for all contract disputes, it is still
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much cheaper and faster than pursuing the dispute through formal litigation. Several
contractors and their attorneys question the Government's willingness to participate in the
Mini-Trial and ADR. Many believe that the Government "talks a good game" (in regards
to the ADR), but does not always follow through on their talk. The final barrier that
exists is the contractor's concern that settlement funds will not be paid in a timely manner
once the dispute has been resolved. If contractors knew settlement funding would be
forthcoming, they would be more inclined to participate in the Mini-Trial and ADR than
pursue resolution of the dispute at the Board or in court.
Conclusion # 4: The U.S. Navy has not been reluctant to utilize the Mini-Trial to
resolve contract disputes.
The Navy was one of the first Government departments or agencies to utilize the
Mini-Trial to resolve contract disputes. Despite a few recent problems encountered with
neutrals during Mini-Trials, the Navy's recent decision to resolve a large, complex dispute
using the Mini-Trial exhibits its current willingness to use the Mini-Trial. Although the
Navy does not utilize the Mini-Trial as much as the Army's Corps of Engineers, it does
selectively use the Mini-Trial when it believes the technique's advantages can best be
exploited. The Mini-Trial was one of the first ADR techniques to gain wide acceptance,
however, the researcher believes that the Navy has "graduated" to other less formal and
less complex dispute resolution methods such as Mediation and Negotiation. Survey
responses received from BCA judges and private attorneys confirm the Navy's willingness
to use the Mini-Trial, as well as its transition towards less formal ADR methods.
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Conclusion # 5: Selection of the "right" principal is key to the success of the Mini-
Trial.
To be an effective Mini-Trial principal, the principal should have strong
negotiation skills, be able to objectively evaluate both parties' presentations, and have the
necessary authority to settle the dispute. The principal must also be able to devote the
necessary time to prepare for and participate in the trial. Furthermore, the principal
should possess certain personality traits that can help the two sides overcome difficulties
and impasses during the trial. These traits include showing a willingness to compromise,
being receptive to innovative solutions, being able to develop mutual respect, and having a
good sense of humor. On the Government's side, choosing a principal from the Senior
Executive Service or flag ranks does not guarantee the principal will have the requisite
tools to be an effective principal.
Conclusion # 6: Despite the Navy's limited success with the '"unassisted" Mini-
Trial, this hybrid technique will not gain wide spread acceptance among ADR
practitioners.
For the unassisted Mini-Trial to be successful, the parties must already have a
strong long-term relationship and both must be willing to compromise. Since contract
disputes challenge even the best of working relationships, many parties need the assistance
of a third party neutral to work through their differences. The neutral can facilitate
discussion, provide objective evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of each party's
position, help break negotiation impasses, and conduct ex parte discussions which may
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help the party's "buy-in" to a suggested resolution. In an unassisted Mini-Trial, there is
no third party neutral. The responsibilities normally performed by a neutral will have to be
performed by the principals. Only the strongest, most capable of principals can handle
these additional responsibilities. Although some principals might be up to the task, the
researcher believes that no Mini-Trial should fail for want of neutral assistance.
Conclusion # 7: Although the third party neutral can fill any role assigned by the
parties, there are two primary roles commonly performed by a neutral to help resolve the
dispute: facilitation of discussions, and evaluation of parties' positions.
The first role commonly filled by the neutral is to facilitate discussion between the
parties. By facilitating discussion, the neutral keeps communications open and the parties
focused on the dispute which prevents the parties from becoming "stuck" on a particular
issue. By focusing the parties on the issues, the neutral can help the parties realize the
common ground that exists between them. The neutral may also conduct ex parte
discussions with the parties which allows the parties to use the neutral as a sounding board
for possible solutions to the dispute. The second role that is often performed by the
neutral is to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each party's position. A neutral
evaluation of both parties' positions can inject a dose of realism into the dispute,
permitting the parties to see their position in a different light. Neutral evaluation can also
give each party an idea of how their position may be viewed by a Board or court judge.
This is particularly true if the neutral has significant Board or court experience and is often
called upon to render judicial decisions.
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Conclusion # 8: Board of Contract Appeals judges are the best choice for neutrals
in a Mini-Trial.
Board of Contract Appeals (BCA) judges acting as Mini-Trial neutrals have a
great many advantages over other neutrals. BCA judges have a wealth of experience in
dealing with contract disputes, are intimately familiar with contract law, and possess
unquestionable credentials. If a party is concerned about possible bias, the judge's public
record of rulings is easily accessible for examination. Unlike their private counterparts
who often charge hundreds of dollars per day, BCA judges are inexpensive, if not free.
Due to their position as a judge, they are regularly called upon to render judicial decisions.
This is particularly helpful if the judge is asked by the parties to predict the outcome of the
dispute if it is not resolved during the Mini-Trial. A BCA judge's stature also carries a
great deal of weight with parties. Recommendations for possible solutions coming from
the judge may facilitate "buy-in" by the parties.
Conclusion # 9: Despite its limitations, the Navy will increase its use of the Mini-
Trial in the future.
As more publicity is given to the Government's successful use of the Mini-Trial,
more contractors and Government agencies will want to use the Mini-Trial. As the phrase
goes, "success breeds popularity". The Mini-Trial saves the parties money and resources
while reducing the time needed to resolve the dispute. It also allows the parties to work
through their dispute while retaining their working relationship. The Mini-Trial's format
forces the parties to condense their arguments into concise best points presentations which
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allows the party's principals to evaluate and resolve the dispute themselves. Unlike
traditional litigation where the judge and attorneys control the outcome, the parties'
principals retain control of the proceedings and decision-making authority. Furthermore,
as the monetary size of claims grows, senior management principals will find it even more
important to participate in disputes. The main thrust of the Mini-Trial is to allow business
decision-makers to make sound business decisions.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following are recommendations dealing with the Government's use of the
Mini-Trial:
Recommendation # 1 : Continue to use the Mini-Trial and alternative dispute
resolution whenever feasible to resolve contract disputes
As discussed in Chapters II and III, ADR and the Mini-Trial present many
advantages over traditional litigation including expediting resolution, saving scarce
financial resources, preserving the on-going working relationships, and maintaining control
over the outcome. In order to streamline the dispute process, the Department of Defense,
and the Navy in particular, should continue to maximize the use of these techniques in
order to save time and money.
Recommendation # 2: Conduct ADR awareness training for both Government
contracting professionals and contractors .
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The better both groups understand ADR and the Mini-Trial, the more likely they
will be to make informed decisions regarding its use. Awareness training will hopefully
convince both groups that ADR is in both parties' best interests.
Recommendation # 3 : Conduct in-depth Mini-Trial training for Government
attorneys .
As discussed in Chapters V and VI, the skills necessary to make an effective Mini-
Trial presentation can be very different from the skills needed for traditional litigation.
This training may help attorneys better represent their clients and prepare stronger
presentations. If sufficient resources are available, the Government may also consider
providing this training to private attorneys on an "as available" basis.
Recommendation # 4: Publicize the Government's success with the Mini-Trial as
much as possible .
Greater publicity will help convince contractors and their attorneys that the
Government is willing and committed to the use of the Mini-Trial. If contractors know
the Navy has successfully used the Mini-Trial, they may be more inclined to use the Mini-
Trial in a future dispute. Publicity can come in the form of magazine articles, agency
circulars, and lectures to civilian contracting, law, and professional organizations.
Recommendation # 5: Establish a policy to ensure contractor's settlement funds
are paid promptly .
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Before entering into a Mini-Trial, the Government party must ensure it has
identified the funds it will use to settle the dispute. If the contractor knows settlement
funding will be paid quickly, it will be less inclined to opt for a Board or court decision.
Recommendation # 6: Provide principals with the authority to make sound
business decisions in a Mini-Trial without the risk of being second-guessed .
Second-guessing can undermine the Mini-Trial process. If principals know their
settlement decisions will receive unnecessary scrutiny, their decisions will include other
non-trial factors. However, if the principals know their decision will not be subject to
second-guessing, they will make the best settlement based on the facts presented during
the trial.
Recommendation # 7: Establish a central point of contact or ombudsman within
each agency to answer contractor's questions regarding the Mini-Trial and ADR
.
If contractors and their attorneys have an objective point of contact to answer their
questions, it may help them make informed decisions on whether to participate in ADR.
Recommendation # 8: Conduct face-to-face meetings between Government and
contractor senior management without the presence of either side's attorneys in order to
convince them that the Mini-Trial is in both parties 7 best interest .
An informal meeting will give the Government the opportunity to convince its
contractor counterparts that the Mini-Trial (or other ADR technique) is in both parties'
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"best interests". By eliminating the participation of each party's attorneys, senior
managers independently decide which forum should be used to resolve the dispute.
If the Government follows these recommendations, the researcher believes both
contractors and Government agencies will be more willing to use the Mini-Trial to resolve
contract disputes.
D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question
How could the United States Navy most effectively utilize the Mini-Trial as a
method of alternative dispute resolution?
The Navy could best utilize the Mini-Trial by selectively choosing which disputes it
tries to resolve using the Mini-Trial. As discussed earlier, not all disputes can or should be
resolved using the Mini-Trial. For example, in circumstances where the dispute can be
resolved through unassisted Negotiation, the Mini-Trial should not be considered since it
would merely prolong the dispute and incur unnecessary legal fees. However, when the
circumstances are ripe for the use of the Mini-Trial, the Navy should attempt to convince
the contractor that resolving the dispute using the Mini-Trial is in both parties' best
interests. Furthermore, once the decision has been made to use the Mini-Trial, senior
Navy management should provide the principal with the requisite authority to settle the
dispute. Second-guessing on the part of senior management should be minimized in order
to empower the principal to make a sound business settlement based on the facts
presented during the trial. If the Navy selects a principal with sound business judgment,
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strong negotiations skills, and the necessary time to devote to the trial, there should be no
reason to second-guess his decision. If senior management does not have faith in the
principal's decision-making, he should not be selected to serve as the Navy's principal.
2. Secondary Research Questions
a. What is the Mini-Trial technique and how does it function?
The Mini-Trial is a structured voluntary settlement process that allows both parties
to submit their positions on a dispute to senior management principals who have the
authority to settle the dispute, or to a third party neutral who helps facilitate discussion
between the principals. Whether a third party is involved or not, the principals are the
only players who have the authority to resolve the issues at hand. After the parties agree
to use the Mini-Trial, they will jointly draft a Mini-Trial agreement document that outlines
the procedures and format that will be followed during the trial. This document also
outlines the role that will be filled by the third party neutral. The neutral can fill a variety
of roles, such as evaluator, facilitator, or mediator. The Mini-Trial allows for a shortened
pre-trial preparation and condensed best case presentations by both parties. Upon
completion of the presentations, the principals attempt to negotiate a settlement, often
with the assistance of a third party neutral. If the parties are able to resolve the dispute,
they will sign a settlement agreement that documents the key ingredients of their
resolution. Like many other ADR techniques, the Mini-Trial is voluntary and non-binding;
therefore a party can drop out at any point in the process.
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b. What are the laws and regulations associated with the Mini-Trial and ADR?
None of the laws and regulations researched address the Mini-Trial in any detail.
However, several of the laws and regulations strongly encourage Government agencies to
utilize alternative dispute resolution (ADR) to the maximum extent practical. In addition
to encouraging the use of ADR, the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 established the
procedures and time frames for parties to file disputes. The Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act (ADRA) of 1990 had the greatest impact on ADR by permitting
Contracting Officers to utilize ADR to resolve contract claims. The Act mandated that
each Federal agency develop its own ADR policy, appoint a senior official as "Dispute
Resolution Specialist", and conduct training for agency attorneys in the field. Its impact
on the Mini-Trial was felt most when the Act authorized agencies to use both public and
private third party neutrals and permitted the sharing of neutrals among agencies. The
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 stressed the importance of using
ADR to resolve contract disputes and required parties to explain in writing the reason for
rejecting another party's request for ADR. The FASA also simplified the rules governing
the procurement of neutrals without competition. The Administrative Dispute Resolution
Act of 1996 made permanent the articles outlined in ADRA 1990. It also protected all
communications between a neutral and parties from disclosure under the Freedom of
Information Act. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) echoed in writing the
importance ofADR as it was stressed in earlier legislation. Executive Orders 12988 and
12979 also provided Presidential support for the use of ADR.
121
c. To what extent has the Navy utilized the Mini-Trial and what have been the
results of its use?
Dating back to its beginnings, the Navy has had a great deal of success with the
Mini-Trial. During the 1980's, the Mini-Trial was one of the primary dispute resolution
methods used by the Navy. The researcher discovered numerous magazine articles that
mentioned the Navy's successful use of the Mini-Trial. Unfortunately, no hard statistics of
the Navy's use of the Mini-Trial were available. By the late 1980's, the Mini-Trial's use
was in decline due to the adoption of less formal and less complex ADR techniques.
Although its use had declined from its peak use in the middle 1980's, the Navy has
continued to use the Mini-Trial when it believed the Mini-Trial was the appropriate
technique to resolve a given dispute. The Naval Sea Systems Command's successful use
of the Mini-Trial in resolving a complex, multi-million dollar dispute with Westinghouse
Corporation in 1996 is continuing proof of the Navy's willingness to use Mini-Trial to
resolve contract disputes.
d. What are the measures of success in employing the Mini-Trial and under what
conditions should the Mini-Trial be considered for use?
As discussed in Chapter VI and Conclusion # 1, the primary measures of success
for the Mini-Trial are the following: resolution of the dispute, cost and time savings
achieved, preservation of the parties' on-going working relationship, and whether the
parties would consider using the Mini-Trial again in a future dispute. Other measures of
success discussed in Chapter VI included narrowing of the issues in the event the parties
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were unable to resolve the dispute, partial resolution of some parts of the dispute, giving
the parties their "day in court", and being able to rationally defend the settlement.
Assuming no ADR "show-stoppers" (e.g., fraud, need for a precedence, anti-ADR
attitudes) exist, the Mini-Trial should be used when the following conditions exist:
the dispute is primarily factual (no complex legal issues involved), the parties want to
maintain control over the outcome of the dispute, both parties recognize some liability in
the dispute, a fairly clear entitlement to consideration exists and the primary task is to
determine the quantum, the dollar amount in dispute is sufficiently large enough to warrant
the time and expense of a Mini-Trial, the parties want to preserve an on-going working
relationship, and senior management is willing to devote sufficient time and support to the
dispute.
e. What actions should the Navy take to most effectively utilize the Mini-Trial as
a viable form of ADR?
First and foremost, the Navy should conduct ADR awareness training for all
Contracting Officers, Program Managers, and other senior contracting officials. Without
their understanding ofwhat the Mini-Trial (and ADR) is, how it works, and when it
should be used, there will be little support for resolving the disputes outside of formal
litigation. Once senior contracting officials are trained, the Navy should conduct Mini-
Trial training for its field office attorneys. As discussed earlier, the skills necessary to
prepare and present a Mini-Trial case are not the same skills used in litigation. Attorney
training should include discussion of the Mini-Trial's structure and procedures, drafting of
pre-trial agreements, and preparation and presentation techniques. The Navy should also
publicize its willingness to use and its success with the Mini-Trial. If contractors and their
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attorneys do not know the Navy is willing to use the Mini-Trial, they will not request it to
resolve a future dispute. Finally, the Navy should ensure settlement funding has been
identified and is available prior to entering the Mini-Trial. If the contractor knows there
will be no difficulty receiving its settlement funds, it will be more inclined to enter into the
Mini-Trial and other ADR techniques.
E. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY
The following are areas for future research dealing with the Mini-Trial:
1
.
Examine the qualifications a neutral should possess to be an effective Mini-Trial
neutral. It would be interesting to see if the qualifications necessary to be an effective
Mini-Trial neutral are the same needed to be an effective neutral in other alternative
dispute resolution techniques that involve neutrals.
2. Explore the problems the Government has encountered with both Government and
private attorneys during Mini-Trials. The researcher received several survey responses
that noted that there were just as many problems with attorneys as there had been with
neutrals and principals during Mini-Trials.
3 Examine the barriers that exist to successfully convince the Government to participate
in a Mini-Trial.
4. Prepare detailed case studies of successful and unsuccessful Navy Mini-Trials. These
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